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THE FOG OF WAR REFORM: CHANGE 
AND STRUCTURE IN THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 
PETER MARGULIES* 
Salim Hamdan’s conviction in a military commission for material 
support of Al Qaeda separates utilitarians, who generally defer to state 
power, from protective theorists, who seek to shield civilians by curbing 
official discretion.  Utilitarians view military commissions as efficient 
means for trying suspected terrorists.  Protective theorists criticize the 
amorphous nature of material support charges. 
The clash between utilitarians and protective theorists colors other 
issues, including “enhanced” interrogation and limits on targeting.  
Protective theorists merit praise for their scrutiny of interrogation.  In 
contrast, utilitarians have trivialized interrogation abuses.  However, 
protective theorists’ scrutiny of states is burdened by hindsight bias.  
Failing to recognize the challenges faced by states, protective theorists 
have ignored the risk to civilians posed by changes such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross’ Guidance on Direct 
Participation in Hostilities that create a “revolving door” shielding bomb 
makers for terrorist groups. 
To move beyond the utilitarian–protective debate, this piece advances 
a structural approach informed by two values: a linear time horizon and 
holistic signaling.  Drawing on cognitive studies of humans’ flawed 
temporal judgment and the Framers’ work on institutional design, a linear 
time horizon curbs both myopia that infects officials and hindsight bias 
that plagues the protective model.  Holistic signaling requires the United 
States to support the law of armed conflict, even (or especially) when 
adversaries such as Al Qaeda reject that framework.  Applying the 
structural test, a state can use a sliding scale of imminence and necessity to 
justify targeting Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists in states unwilling or unable 
to apprehend them.  However, the material support charges against 
Hamdan signal a troubling turn to victors’ justice. 
 
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University.  I thank Bill Banks, Bill Kuebler, and 
David Luban for comments on a previous draft. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Driving Osama bin Laden was not a Broadway play.  Years before 
the Al Qaeda leader entered the compound in Abottabad, Pakistan, 
that became his last residence, a Yemeni national, Salim Hamdan, acted 
as his driver, doubling as bodyguard and weapons broker.  Hamdan 
knew the general purpose of Al Qaeda’s plots but did not aid a 
particular conspiracy.  Yet, during the American intervention in 
Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, United States forces took 
custody of Hamdan, eventually charging him with material support of a 
terrorist group, which Congress in 2006 made a crime triable before a 
military commission.1  International law and the Constitution’s Ex Post 
Facto Clause would make his 2008 conviction problematic,2 unless his 
conduct violated the common law of war.3 
As Hamdan’s case illustrates, September 11 intensified conflict over 
changes in international humanitarian law (IHL) that states and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had been debating since the 
Cold War and the twilight of European colonialism.4  In the immediate 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration asserted 
that suspected terrorists were not even entitled to protection under IHL, 
otherwise known as the “law of war” or the “law of armed conflict” 
(LOAC).5  IHL’s leading NGO, the International Committee of the Red 
 
1. See United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1259, 1274 (C.M.C.R. 2011).  
Congress had acted after the Supreme Court struck down the presidential order unilaterally 
establishing military commissions.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006). 
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also DAVID LUBAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 14–15 (2010) (discussing basic principles of criminal 
law, including (1) legality, which states that a person cannot be convicted for conduct that is 
not unlawful, (2) fair notice, and (3) that no criminal law be applied retroactively). 
3. In June 2011, a military court upheld his conviction.  See Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 
1254.  Earning credit for time served, he was released in January 2009.  Id. at 1260. 
4. See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in 
Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing 
Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 201–04 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and 
Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 795, 796 (2010); Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, 
Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy 1–2 (Harv. U. Program on 
Humanitarian Pol’y & Conflict Res., Occasional Paper Series, No. 2, Winter 2005) 
[hereinafter Watkin, Warriors Without Rights], available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper2.pdf. 
5. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to the President (Jan. 25, 2002), in THE 
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 118, 118–19 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua 
L. Dratel eds., 2005).  Bush administration officials also sought to preclude federal courts 
from reviewing the legality of detentions.  See PETER MARGULIES, LAW’S DETOUR: JUSTICE 
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Cross (ICRC), also entered the change game, proposing curbs on the 
targeting of nominal civilians who participate in hostilities.6  Both the 
Bush administration and ICRC efforts failed to command a consensus 
among stakeholders.  Exploring the reasons for that failure, and the 
probability of change on other fronts, requires a structural theory of 
LOAC, which I offer in this Article. 
The course of change in the law has been unsteady because of the 
role of non-state actors.  When states were the primary actors in armed 
conflicts, reciprocity helped assure cooperation.7  States were repeat 
players in armed conflicts,8 and therefore had an incentive to regard 
such conflicts as prisoner’s dilemma games with infinite iterations.  In 
such games, today’s defection by one party is promptly punished by the 
offended party.  Because the original offender knows that defecting 
from the accepted framework will not yield a net return, timely 
retaliation restores the normative equilibrium.9 
Reciprocity has less of a hold on non-state actors.  While certain 
rebel groups may see themselves as aspiring repeat players,10 terrorist 
 
DISPLACED IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 54–57 (2010); see also KAREN GREENBERG, 
THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 45–47 (2009) (describing post-
September 11 government legal opinions concluding that Guantanamo detentions would not 
be subject to judicial review).  The Supreme Court pushed back in a series of cases, 
culminating in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (striking down habeas corpus-
stripping provisions of Military Commissions Act of 2006). 
6. See NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON 
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 33–36 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC GUIDANCE], available at 
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/20/Legal%20Conference/ICRC_002_0990.pdf. 
7. See MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE LAW 
OF WAR 33 (2009) (stating that, in LOAC, “reciprocity was long considered a crucial method 
of deterring war crime”); Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW: 2007–2008, at 23, 37 (2008) (asserting 
that reciprocity enforces norms on treatment of prisoners of war and that a party to a conflict 
treats captives from its adversary’s forces well to encourage the same treatment of its 
captured forces); cf. Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365, 
397 (2009) (discussing importance of reciprocity in Fourth Hague Convention of 1907). 
8. See Watts, supra note 7, at 401. 
9. See Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT’L ORG. 1, 6–8 
(1986); Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 506 
(2006) [hereinafter Posner, Welfarist Approach]. 
10. See Audie Klotz, Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. 
Sanctions Against South Africa, 49 INT’L ORG. 451, 463 (1995) (discussing the collaboration 
between the African National Congress and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to call for 
international sanctions on South Africa); see also Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra 
note 4, at 36 (discussing certain groups’ concern about international opinion). 
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networks such as Al Qaeda envision an ideal dominion in the indefinite 
future untouched by reciprocity’s mundane demands.11 
Violent non-state actors such as terrorist networks reject the 
transparency that LOAC seeks to promote.  For example, LOAC has 
traditionally required that individuals participating in hostilities wear 
insignias that set them apart from civilians.12  Consider a group that 
orders a suicide bombing on a crowded bus.  The bomber has violated 
the insignia requirement; moreover, the bus bombing also violates the 
principle of distinction, another traditional requirement of LOAC, 
which requires a party to an armed conflict to target only those 
individuals who participate in the conflict.13  Such violations complicate 
compliance for states whose nationals are the planned victims of attacks.  
State compliance with the principle of distinction is difficult when 
members of organized armed groups do not wear insignias.  Moreover, 
uncertainty about the time and place of the next terrorist attack tempts 
 
11. See ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE 
TERRORISM 121–22 (2005) (quoting Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s longtime second 
in command and successor, as envisioning “restoration of the caliphate”); cf. BRUCE 
HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 169 (1998) (“[T]errorists . . . live in the future . . . for that 
distant—yet imperceptibly close—point in time when they will assuredly triumph over their 
enemies and attain the ultimate realization of their political destiny.”). 
12. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
art. 4(A)(2)(b), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva 
Convention].  In controversial moves that leading states have not fully accepted, the 1977 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions allowed non-state actors “fighting against 
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes” to assert lawful 
authority for their efforts, and it also allowed parties engaged in nonconventional warfare to 
refuse to wear distinguishing insignia or carry arms openly until the time immediately 
preceding an attack.  See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 
1(4), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].  The United 
States has declined to ratify Additional Protocol I because of concerns about these provisions, 
but it considers other provisions of Protocol I to be customary international law that binds 
both states and individuals.  See Michael J. Matheson, Remarks, Session One: The United 
States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 420 (1987); cf. 
Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against 
Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 344–47 (2009) (discussing political agendas that contributed 
to enactment of Protocol I).  
13. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 48; see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE 
VIOLENCE OF PEACE: AMERICA’S WARS IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 58 (2011) (referring to 
principle of “discrimination” that bars targeting noncombatants); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 89 (2d 
ed. 2010); MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE 
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT § 1.2.2 (2006) 
(describing principle of distinction as the “foundation” of LOAC). 
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states to engage in coercive interrogation techniques that violate 
LOAC.14 
Two schools of thought have sought to cope with reciprocity’s 
declining influence.  Many NGOs favor what this Article calls the 
protective approach.  The protective approach emerged from a concern 
with shielding civilians that is part and parcel of core LOAC principles, 
such as distinction.15  From this widely shared point of origin, however, 
followers of the protective paradigm soon wade into greater 
controversy.  The protective agenda entails easing limits on non-state 
organized armed groups and imposing new constraints on states.  For 
example, the protective paradigm allows groups to act without 
distinguishing insignias until the very brink of an armed attack.16  NGOs 
pursuing the protective paradigm have also sought to limit states’ ability 
to target non-state actors that participate in violence.17  The protective 
agenda would allow organized armed groups to maximize the 
information asymmetries they currently enjoy,18 without undertaking the 
burdens that states must accept.  Unfortunately, the protective 
paradigm’s partisans fail to recognize that allowing non-state actors to 
free ride in this fashion only enhances the risk to civilians. 
 
14. See OSIEL, supra note 7, at 57; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 75 
(barring torture and “violence” directed at detainees); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 3(1)(a), (c), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] (barring torture, cruelty, and 
“humiliating and degrading treatment”). 
15. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(5)(b) (requiring proportionality by 
barring attacks causing collateral damage to civilians that are “excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”); SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.1.1.4 
(explaining that the rule of proportionality is derived from the principle of distinction). 
16. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 44(3). 
17. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 33–36.  For disagreement with the ICRC’s 
position, see Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 699 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, 
Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities] (criticizing the ICRC’s guidance as failing 
“to fully appreciate the operational complexity of modern warfare”); and Kenneth Watkin, 
Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 643–44 (2010) 
[hereinafter Watkin, Opportunity Lost] (criticizing the ICRC’s guidance as creating 
asymmetries favoring non-state actors over states); see also infra notes 233–241 (arguing that 
ICRC guidance is not viable as a change to LOAC). 
18. Information asymmetries are gaps that favor one party.  See, e.g., Cary Coglianese et 
al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 277, 280 (2004) (stating “information asymmetries between producers and consumers 
[are] widely accepted as justifying certain kinds of regulatory interventions”). 
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For a convenient bookend to the protective paradigm, consider what 
I call the utilitarian perspective.  While utilitarians recognize the peril of 
non-state actors’ free riding, they propose an overbroad remedy: 
loosening all state constraints not required by reciprocity.  Utilitarians 
rely on the leaders of strong democracies, particularly the United States, 
to arrive at the greatest good for the greatest possible number.19  
Competing internal actors, such as courts, or external stakeholders, such 
as NGOs, lack the information to provide useful alternatives.20  
Unfortunately, utilitarians’ certitude blinds them to the United States’ 
stake in a world order that depends on LOAC’s norms. 
Rules sought by both the protective and utilitarian schools have 
been highly unstable in application and acceptance.  Attempts to ease 
limits on armed non-state actors have been greeted with skepticism by 
strong states, which have tended to believe that such changes would put 
civilians, as well as their own forces, at greater risk.21  However, the 
utilitarians’ proposed changes have fared no better.  Efforts to create a 
gap in the applicability of IHL to suspected terrorists have roiled both 
rule of law constituencies abroad and institutions at home, such as the 
courts and the military.22  More recent efforts to try suspected terrorists 
 
19. See generally Posner, Welfarist Approach, supra note 9, at 490–91. 
20. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER 
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 26 (2010) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE 
UNBOUND]; ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 62–64 (2009) (asserting 
that NGOs are largely irrelevant to operative global norms, which states set); ERIC A. 
POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE 
COURTS 274–75 (2007) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE] 
(arguing that legal curbs on national security strategy are futile and inefficient); JOHN YOO, 
WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 106 (2006) 
(arguing that legal restrictions can slow down intelligence efforts and put national security at 
risk).  But see Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the 
Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 66 (2011) 
(criticizing Posner and Vermeule as too readily dismissing constraints); Deborah N. 
Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 783, 785–88 (2011) (arguing against undue deference to executive branch).  An 
early collaborator of Posner’s, Harvard’s Jack Goldsmith, has most recently combined 
lingering wariness about the efficacy of international institutions with a recognition of the 
utility of constraints.  Compare JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (2005) (expressing skepticism about NGOs’ agendas and states’ 
interests), with Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, 
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1835 (2009) (discussing accounts of 
international and constitutional law as coordinated games in which parties decline short-term 
benefits to realize gains over time). 
21. See Newton, supra note 12, at 343–47. 
22. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006) (defining non-international 
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in military commissions for material support of terrorism have also 
triggered controversy.23 
Explaining the failure of these innovations requires a structural 
model of LOAC, in which changes develop in a two-level game.24  One 
level involves domestic institutions, including the executive branch, the 
military, and the courts.  On the second level, strong states, including the 
United States and its European allies, interact with NGOs.  Strong 
states usually seek utilitarian changes, while NGOs such as the ICRC 
advance a protective agenda.  Leaders that persuade domestic 
stakeholders in Level 1 will also find common ground with NGOs in 
Level 2.  In contrast, state initiatives that lack domestic institutional 
support will face unified NGO opposition.  By the same token, NGOs 
that fail to elicit support from Level 1 stakeholders will face unified 
opposition from strong democracies and splintering within their own 
coalition.  Interaction at both levels turns on two values: linear time 
horizons and holistic signaling. 
A linear time horizon, focused on by both the Founders and modern 
cognitive psychologists, requires rational discounting of present and 
long-term risks and understanding of both immediate and long-term 
causes.25  Unfortunately, this ideal is difficult to attain for both 
individuals and organizations.  Each skews time horizons, unduly 
discounting anything beyond the present and immediate future.26  
 
armed conflict governed by Geneva Common Article 3’s constraints as including any conflict 
not between nations, including United States’ conflict with Al Qaeda); Deborah Pearlstein, 
Justice Stevens and the Expert Executive, 99 GEO. L.J. 1301, 1310–11 (2011) [hereinafter 
Pearlstein, Justice Stevens] (discussing factors that drove Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion in 
Hamdan). 
23. See David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military 
Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 24–31 (2005) (retracing early American history of military 
commissions and finding persistent ambiguity about authority for creating them, particularly 
through unilateral executive action). 
24. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 436 (1988). 
25. I use the term “linear” metaphorically here, to convey a norm that approximates the 
discounting of a rational actor.  Graphing this function would actually require a curve.  See 
Philip Streich & Jack S. Levy, Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice, 51 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 199, 201–03 & fig.1 (2007) (graphing rational discount function). 
26. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 45–46 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (noting 
tendency to inappropriately discount future costs); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and 
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 443–44 (1997) (stating that “commitment 
mechanisms” such as savings plans are tools that correct for the tendency to unduly discount 
the future); George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J. 
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Cognitive psychologists call this flaw myopia or presentism.  Cognitive 
flaws also distort perceptions of the past through myopia’s rearview 
mirror: hindsight bias.  In hindsight bias, people focus on the 
immediately apparent causes of harm, particularly if that harm is 
graphic and vivid.  Longer-term causes get short shrift.27 
Just as individuals use savings accounts as a hedge against myopia 
and maxims like “hindsight is 20/20” to ward off hindsight bias, states 
and organizations develop structural features to deal with flaws in 
temporal judgment.  Hamilton viewed judicial review as a crucial 
safeguard against rule by the “humors” of the moment,28 and courts 
since the Founding Era have sought to harmonize statutes, the 
Constitution, and international law, including the law of war.29  To 
preserve temporal balance, Level 1 institutions such as domestic courts 
have long upheld what I call “identification norms.”  These core norms 
ensure that government uses reliable criteria to apply its power.  
Violations engender arbitrary results and undermine courts’ integrity.  
Since the Founding Era, courts have protected identification norms in 
wartime cases involving property30 and persons.31  NGOs have 
consistently sought to reinforce this understanding.  Courts also have 
forged doctrines, including official immunities,32 standing,33 and the 
 
ECON. 1209, 1228 (2003) (explaining the consequences of hyperbolic discounting); Daniel 
Read, Intertemporal Choice, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION 
MAKING 424, 428–29 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2007) (noting tendency of 
individuals to prefer “smaller-sooner reward”); Streich & Levy, supra note 25, at 205 (“[T]he 
value of a reward drops significantly in the immediate future, so that individuals are very 
impatient with regard to short time delays” (citation omitted)). 
27. See Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases 
in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 345 
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (explaining that individuals can find a large number of 
predictors for an event with almost any desired correlation); George Loewenstein & Erik 
Angner, Predicting and Indulging Changing Preferences, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC 
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 351, 372 (George 
Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003) (defining hindsight bias as a situation where “people project 
their own current knowledge on themselves in the past”). 
28. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
29. See David Golove, The Supreme Court, the War on Terror, and the American Just 
War Constitutional Tradition, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 561, 561–62 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011). 
30. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 120–21 (1804). 
31. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). 
32. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 ¶¶ 51–53, Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg., 2002 I.C.J. 
3 (Feb. 14, 2002) (analyzing official immunity under international law).  But see id. ¶ 61 
(holding that officials do not have immunity in international tribunals, which consider charges 
of torture or violation of other fundamental norms).  See generally LUBAN ET AL., supra note 
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political question doctrine,34 that curb hindsight bias by limiting judicial 
second-guessing of executive action in wartime. 
A linear time horizon alone is insufficient to support the structure of 
LOAC; the second element is what I call holistic signaling.35  In a world 
of imperfect information, a party sends a signal to provide data about its 
intentions and capabilities, limiting the risk of misunderstanding or 
mistrust.  For example, the white flag of surrender gained acceptance 
because a party accepting surrender requires assurance that those 
inviting capture are not luring in their attacker to get a better shot and a 
party inviting capture must know that it will not be slaughtered where it 
stands.  Since neither side knows the precise intent of the other, 
bloodshed would continue without a symbol that bridges the gap. 
Holistic signaling reveals a party’s commitment to habits that 
facilitate multilateral cooperation.  Strong states with a stake in the 
global system must send signals on LOAC that are consistent with their 
wishes for the system as a whole.36  Holistic signals are important even 
(or perhaps especially) when some parties will decline to reciprocate.  
This divorce from reciprocity and tangible benefits leads utilitarians, 
who raised awareness of the signaling lexicon,37 to view holistic signaling 
as an afterthought.  However, utilitarians fail to understand that an 
audience of other states, NGOs, and international public opinion that 
perceives strong states as free riders will no longer look to those states 
for leadership. 
To examine the prospects for change in LOAC, we need to assess 
the time horizons and signaling capabilities of states, NGOs, and non-
state actors.  States start out with an edge in the time horizon category 
 
2, at 265–95 (analyzing current law of official immunity). 
33. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see also Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 14–35 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that father lacked standing to bring suit in challenge 
to alleged targeting of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, whom the United States regarded as the leader of 
Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula). 
34. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 9–10, 52 (holding that 
legality of targeting United States citizen allegedly engaged in terrorist acts abroad is political 
question textually committed to other branches).  See generally Robert M. Chesney, National 
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1392–1400 (2009) (discussing factors triggering 
judicial deference to executive determinations). 
35. See OSIEL, supra note 7, at 312–14 (using compliance with LOAC to signal faith in 
the system); see also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18–23 (2000) (discussing 
signaling in everyday contexts). 
36. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL 
CHOICE THEORY 212–13 (2008). 
37. See POSNER, supra note 35, at 18–27. 
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because their existence over time in a fixed space lends stability.38  To 
gain additional perspectives and correct for myopia, they can develop 
deliberative bodies such as courts and participate in international 
institutions.39  States’ need to exist in a stable territory over time also 
provides a substantial incentive to respect the comparable needs of 
other states.  States signal their commitment to reciprocity in armed 
conflict through signals, such as requiring their forces to wear uniforms.  
However, even democratic states find their time horizon and signaling 
skewed in times of crises. 
While crises lead strong states into “states of exception” where 
norms do not hold,40 the standard operating procedures of armed non-
state actors reveal pervasive deficits in temporal judgment and signaling.  
In terrorist networks, for example, the need to preserve secrecy impedes 
the development of diverse deliberative institutions.41  Moreover, 
terrorist networks like Al Qaeda, which seek a new dawn of the 
caliphate, not the dreary task of administration, have no incentive to 
signal in ways that conform to LOAC.42 
Ironically, NGOs’ focus on combating the myopia of states 
compounds their own time horizon and signaling problems.  NGOs 
strive to uphold identification norms that states sometimes discount.  
However, NGOs have few institutional checks against myopia’s twin, 
hindsight bias.  NGOs’ donor base rewards prompt and vigorous 
criticism of state conduct, but typically discounts the challenges 
governments face in an uncertain world.43  Hindsight bias and signaling 
 
38. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 54 (1977). 
39. See Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus ad 
Bellum: A Normative Framework, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: 
EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 157, 174 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007) 
(“States perform useful functions in the international system; indeed, the global architecture 
relies on States.”). 
40. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 
1096–98 (2009); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1014–18 (2003). 
41. See HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 179–80. 
42. See Max Abrahms, What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and 
Counterterrorism Strategy, INT’L SECURITY, Spring 2008, at 78, 85–86 (noting that terrorist 
organizations do not want compromise). 
43. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 60 (2007) (critiquing incentive structure of NGOs); Kenneth 
Anderson, “Accountability” as “Legitimacy”: Global Governance, Global Civil Society and 
the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 841, 842–44 (2011) (same). 
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take a different turn, however, when strong states intervene to prevent 
humanitarian catastrophes.  Many NGOs urge such intervention despite 
their concerns about collateral damage and the absence (as in Kosovo) 
of formal United Nations authorization.44  Moreover, some NGOs send 
subtle pro-intervention signals by downplaying their denunciation of 
measures, such as targeted killing, that could also be strategically 
advantageous in humanitarian interventions. 
Where state officials face temptations to skew their time horizon and 
weaken compliance signals, stakeholders at Levels 1 and 2 will resist 
utilitarian changes.  This dynamic stymied proposed utilitarian changes 
like depriving suspected terrorists of Geneva protections.  By the same 
token, strong states will block protective changes that increase a non-
state actor’s ability to free ride.  The ICRC’s proposed limits on states’ 
ability to target individuals, such as bomb makers, have met this fate. 
Focusing on differentials in temporal judgment and signaling 
capacity is also useful for examining emerging problems in LOAC, 
including determining which crimes are triable by military commissions 
and the appropriate scope of self-defense.  Punishing individuals 
captured years ago for the freshly enacted war crime of material support 
would violate the linear time horizon’s central tenet—that notice must 
precede conduct that gives rise to punishment.  Similarly, making 
material support a war crime would send the dangerous signal that war 
crimes are no different from the ordinary criminal law.  A structural 
approach would allow greater flexibility in targeted killing, including a 
sliding scale for self-defense based on both the imminence and certainty 
of a threat.45  However, a state would have to observe identification 
norms and restrict its targeting to fighters for Al Qaeda or associated 
groups that international organizations have identified as global terrorist 
threats found in countries that are unwilling or unable to apprehend or 
target those individuals. 
This Article is in six parts.  Part II provides a brief primer on 
continuity and change in LOAC.  Part III assesses the virtues and vices 
 
44. See Richard J. Goldstone, The Role of the International Criminal Court, in MASS 
ATROCITY CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTURE OUTRAGES 55, 61 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2010) 
(describing how NATO forces in Kosovo minimized civilian casualties despite heavy bombing 
campaigns). 
45. See Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the 
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, in 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 4–5, 19–22, 24 (Michael N. Schmitt et al. eds., 2011) (analyzing 
justifications for state’s use of deadly force to eliminate suspected terrorists). 
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of the utilitarian and protective approaches to LOAC changes.  Part IV 
introduces the structural approach, including linear time horizon and 
holistic signaling.  Part V compares the temporal judgment and signaling 
capacities of states, non-state actors, and NGOs, and applies the model 
to the Bush administration’s proposed changes on interrogations and 
the ICRC’s suggested targeting limits.  Part VI offers analysis of 
material support as a war crime and remote targeted killing.  Part VII 
addresses criticisms of the model, including the argument that it 
privileges Western modes of warfare. 
II.  A SHORT HISTORY OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE LAWS OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 
The law of war is an evolving effort to preserve ways to end 
hostilities and enforce a bright line between combatants, who can be 
targeted, and those on the outside (the hors de combat), who are 
immune.46  Bright lines do not stop the bloodshed of war.  However, 
they channel it to prevent unnecessary killing and to limit war’s impact.  
Rules are crucial because more amorphous boundaries would 
exacerbate information asymmetries.  Gaps in information about a 
party’s intentions and capacities impede cooperation in business and 
politics.47  They destroy the potential for cooperation in the already 
fractious environment of the battlefield. 
Illustrating the role and importance of rules, LOAC protects 
individuals such as civilians, who lack the right to target others; it also 
protects combatants who wish to leave the fray through surrender to the 
enemy.48  Soldiers will surrender only if they can be assured that they 
will be treated humanely, and they will fight on beyond the needs of 
strategy if they cannot be so assured.49  Similarly, using the pretense of 
surrender to kill an adversary constitutes the war crime of perfidy.50  
 
46. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 18 (discussing distress caused by Henry V’s order to 
kill French captives during the battle of Agincourt, which the English ultimately won, and 
English knights’ refusal to obey order, in part out of concern for “‘dishonor that . . . would 
reflect on themselves’” (footnte omitted)); Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra note 4, at 
64 (“[T]here has always been an obligation to distinguish combatants from civilians.”). 
47. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 271–72 (1984). 
48. See 2 PIERINO BELLI, A TREATISE ON MILITARY MATTERS AND WARFARE 88 
(Herbert C. Nutting trans., 1936) (quoting Cicero). 
49. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 8–9 (2010) (discussing World War II battle of Iwo Jima). 
50. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 46 (noting that prisoners of war can seek to escape, 
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LOAC prohibit perfidy precisely because it produces doubt in a 
capturing force about the sincerity of a defeated force’s attempt to 
surrender, and thereby discourages a victorious force from honoring 
that attempt.  The result is a spiral toward the wholesale abuse of 
captives on both sides. 
The laws of war that protect captives51 and prohibit perfidy have long 
been enforced through reciprocity.  Each side knows that it can readily 
find itself in the position where it must either surrender or accept the 
surrender of an opponent.  Obeying ground rules in these situations 
gives one’s opponent an incentive to do the same.  If parties know they 
will see each other through the course of an armed conflict, or have 
dealings upon that conflict’s resolution, upholding reciprocity is prudent 
as well as legally and ethically mandatory. 
The customary understandings about LOAC is that structured 
warfare for centuries became inadequate because of the advent of 
centralized states, the rise of technology, and the increasing prominence 
of violent non-state actors in the last two hundred years.  The mass 
armies mobilized during the Napoleonic Era supplanted the smaller 
mercenary units of contending monarchs.52  Innovations in arms, 
including the advent of machine guns and the later rise of air power, 
deepened the risk of harm to civilians.53  The Lieber Code, drafted 
during the American Civil War, prioritized military necessity but also 
acknowledged the “distinction between the private individual belonging 
to a hostile country and . . . its men in arms,” adding that the latter 
should “be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the 
exigencies of war will admit.”54  The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration 
 
but can be punished if they kill a guard, since those surrendering “committed themselves to 
stop fighting . . . [and] gave up their right to kill”). 
51. See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, FLORENTINE HISTORIES 166–67 (Laura F. Banfield & 
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., trans., 1988) (recounting a cautionary example of a military leader 
who mistreated captives). 
52. See Michael Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century 
War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, in THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 389, 394 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green 
eds., 1998). 
53. SOLIS, supra note 49, at 51 (discussing developments in weaponry during the 
nineteenth century); Schmitt, supra note 52, at 394; Schmitt, supra note 4, at 814–16 
(discussing the effect of antipersonnel mines and incendiary and chemical weapons on civilian 
populations). 
54. See Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in 
the Field, at art. 22 (Apr. 24, 1863), in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF 
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3, 6 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri 
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adjusted to technological changes by urging “[t]hat the progress of 
civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the 
calamities of war,” and cautioned  against “employment of arms which 
uselessly aggravate . . . suffering[].”55 
Parties participating in the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 were 
also concerned about the prospect of runaway harm to civilians.  Their 
agreement included the Martens Clause, which advised that all persons 
“remain under the protection and empire of the principles of 
international law [resulting] . . . from the usages established between 
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the 
public conscience.”56  To make this sentiment more concrete, the 1907 
Hague Convention required that combatants act under a fixed 
command structure, wear insignia that were visible from a distance, and 
refrain from killing civilians.57  The rules on command structure and 
insignia promoted discipline and prevented perfidy; they also had a 
prophylactic effect in both warning civilians about the proximity of 
armed forces and promoting accountability for lapses in discipline that 
resulted in needless civilian deaths.58 
The increased use of mass armies also required careful demarcations 
on the scope of accountability, which separated wrongful decisions to 
initiate war—the domain of jus ad bellum—from the wrongful conduct 
of war, governed by jus in bello.  Leaders might order an unjust war to 
wrest territory or resources from an opponent.  However, soldiers on a 
side that fought an unjust war were nonetheless privileged to fight as 
long as they themselves did not commit war crimes, such as harming 
captives or civilians.59  This separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
 
Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Lieber Code]. 
55. See Preamble to Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, in LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 54, at 
91, 92; see also SOLIS, supra note 49, at 50 (discussing St. Petersburg Declaration); Schmitt, 
supra note 4, at 799 (same). 
56. See Preamble to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and Its Annex, in LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 54, at 60, 61; see also 
DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 13, at 8–9 (discussing Martens 
Clause); Schmitt, supra note 4, at 800 (same). 
57. See Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra note 4, at 21. 
58. The Hague Conference featured disagreement on the formality required of states in 
distinguishing their combatants from civilians.  Id. at 21. 
59. See Lieber Code art. 57, supra note 54, at 10 (stating that a soldier is privileged 
belligerent, and hence his killing of other belligerents is not a violation of laws of armed 
conflict); Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum 
and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 48–49 (2009); cf. 
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has both procedural and institutional justifications.  As a procedural 
matter, prosecuting foot soldiers in an unjust war would itself be unjust.  
Going to war is a decision of a national community backed by domestic 
laws, which an individual cannot control.  Penalizing individuals for a 
community decision over which they had no control would be patently 
unfair.60  Eroding the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello would 
also have significant institutional consequences in an era of mass armies.  
The prospect of individual liability for foot soldiers in an unjust war 
would encourage draft resistance ex ante, even if the war turned out to 
be just.  Even just wars can inspire widespread domestic resistance, as 
the Civil War draft riots demonstrated.61  Individual liability would 
exacerbate this problem, impairing the ability of states to make 
decisions.  Furthermore, a state would confront difficulty in ending a 
war, if soldiers on the losing side faced individual liability because of the 
victor’s view that their cause was unjust.  Here, too, individuals might 
hold out, electing to fight on because they had no stake in reconciliation.  
The separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello alleviates both of these 
problems. 
The aftermath of World War II saw further significant developments 
in both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  The Geneva Conventions 
codified rules on the treatment of captives by barring torture, cruelty, 
and degrading treatment;62 by requiring competent tribunals to 
determine prisoner of war (POW) status;63 and by providing courts with 
procedural guarantees for the adjudication of war crimes.64  
Technological advances continue to be a concern, although the 
International Court of Justice seemed to recognize that permitting 
nuclear weapons might actually discourage new global conflicts.65  The 
 
Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in Warfare 
Against Nonstate Actors, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 541, 541 (2009) (suggesting that increasing role 
of non-state actors has reduced utility of separation). 
60. See F.M. Kamm, Failures of Just War Theory: Terror, Harm, and Justice, 114 ETHICS 
650, 676–77 (2004). 
61. See ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN 
SLAVERY 256, 259 (2010). 
62. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 3 (forbidding “the passing of 
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court”).  As a matter of customary law, the provisions of this Article 
also apply to civilians in both international and non-international armed conflicts.   
63. Id. art. 5. 
64. Id. art. 3(1)(d). 
65. The court formally declined to take a position on the legality of nuclear weapons.  
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 262 
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United Nations Charter barred aggressive war, permitting the use of 
force only in self-defense or on the authorization of the Security 
Council.66 
In the last forty years, the rise of non-state actors has prompted new 
tensions.  Drafters of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
believed that non-state actors “fighting against colonial domination and 
. . . racist régimes”67 had standing to participate in international armed 
conflict.  That innovation challenged the traditional jus ad bellum norm 
of “right authority,” which extends to state actors the sole privilege of 
conducting hostilities while denying this privilege to non-state actors, 
whom LOAC has traditionally assumed could obtain a remedy from 
their states of nationality.68  While compelling examples supporting 
higher status for non-state actors span centuries, from the American 
colonists at Lexington and Concord to the African National Congress 
(ANC), the drafters of Additional Protocol I did not provide any 
criteria for deciding which group among rivals would be found the 
authentic representative.  This definitional vacuum left inter-group 
violence as the default selection process, risking harm to members of the 
community that each group purports to represent. 
Protocol I yielded additional anomalies.  While it codified the 
principle of distinction that forbids targeting civilians,69 it also made 
 
(July 8, 1996); cf. OSIEL, supra note 7, at 66 (commenting on possible rationales for the 
court’s decision, including the need to preserve threat of nuclear reprisal as an effective 
deterrent).  But see DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 13, at 85–86 
(criticizing the court for failing to offer clear guidance).   
66. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; cf. Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 34–35 
(Apr. 9, 1949) (holding that British mine-sweeping operations within Albanian territorial 
waters after mine explosions damaged British vessels in “innocent passage” through waters 
violated Albanian sovereignty, despite multilateral agreements between Britain, France, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States to coordinate regional mine-sweeping); Jonathan A. 
Bush, “The Supreme . . . Crime” and Its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of 
Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324, 2365–66 (2002) (noting Attorney General and 
chief Nuremberg prosecutor Robert Jackson’s view of aggressor nations as “outlaws from the 
international community”). 
67. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 1(4). 
68. See Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra note 4, at 17 (describing the long-
standing perception that public wars carried out by the “right authority” are legitimate); 3 E. 
DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 318 (James 
Brown Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758) (right to make war “belongs solely 
to the sovereign power” who is best situated to judge circumstances “of the utmost 
importance to the welfare of the State”); cf. SOLIS, supra note 49, at 123–25 (discussing the 
United States’ objection to Additional Protocol I’s protection for non-state actors).  
69. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 48. 
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concessions to irregular forces that severely complicated 
implementation of that “basic principle.”  Article 44(3) shields such 
forces until they have “engaged in a military deployment preceding the 
launching of an attack.”70  Some countries have construed this language 
as barring targeting of such forces until “‘moments immediately prior to 
an attack.’”71  Because a state’s uniformed forces can be targeted at any 
time,72 this reading creates a marked asymmetry in the targeting options 
of non-state and state actors.  The drafters felt that this tactical 
advantage would at least encourage non-state actors to shun the most 
egregious forms of perfidy, where no arms were displayed until the 
attack was in progress.73  Although some non-state actors may have 
considered availing themselves of this opportunity, one cannot imagine 
Al Qaeda operatives following suit.74  However, a non-state fighting 
force without the duty to identify itself will impel states to cut corners 
on the principle of distinction, shooting first and asking questions about 
participation in hostilities later.  As with even more blatant forms of 
perfidy, the result is greater risk to those hors de combat. 
Because LOAC, like other forms of international law, is increasingly 
fragmented,75 the increasing role of non-state actors has buttressed 
arguments for giving states more flexibility in the jus ad bellum.  For 
 
70. See id. art. 44(3)(b); cf. Corri Zoli, Humanizing Irregular Warfare: Framing 
Compliance for Nonstate Armed Groups at the Intersection of Security and Legal Analyses, in 
NEW BATTLEFIELDS OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 190, 197 
(William C. Banks ed., 2011) (arguing that provisions of Additional Protocol I lessens the 
sanctions on violent non-state actors); Newton, supra note 12, at 346–47 (same).   
71. See Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra note 4, at 33 n.135 (quoting MICHAEL 
BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 254 (1982)).   
72. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 142. 
73. See Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra note 4, at 32–33 & n.132 (citing 15 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED 
CONFLICTS 454 (1978) (stating the measure gave “the guerrilla fighter an incentive to 
distinguish himself from the civilian population”)). 
74. Cf. SOLIS, supra note 49, at 125–29 (discussing the United States’ objection to 
Additional Protocol I); Newton, supra note 12, at 360–61 (suggesting that September 11 made 
the change obsolete); W. Michael Reisman, Holding the Center of the Law of Armed Conflict, 
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 852, 858 (2006) (describing incentive argument as one of “doubtful 
logic”). 
75. See Marko Milanović, Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?, 
20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 69, 69 (2009) (discussing tensions between human rights and 
other sources of international law); Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional 
Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 485 
(2008) (rejecting claim that “single regime” can govern international law on regulation and 
private property). 
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example, states dealing with ideologically committed terrorist networks 
have sought to relax the customary requirement of imminent attack as a 
condition for self-defense.  Scholars argued that obliging a state to wait 
until a terrorist plot approaches consummation was both unrealistic and 
risky for civilians whom the network plans to target.76 
These debates have accelerated since September 11.  Two opposing 
developments each reflected an effort to change LOAC.  First, in the 
eighteen months after September 11, Bush administration officials 
sought to deprive suspected terrorists of protections against coercive 
interrogation and also sought to establish indefinite detention without 
judicial review and military commission trials that lacked fundamental 
guarantees of fairness.77  Even more recently, the ICRC proposed that 
civilians be shielded from targeting even if they have participated in 
hostilities.78  Over the objections of a majority of commentators 
convened for its study, the ICRC asserted that only civilians with a 
narrowly defined “continuous combat function” could be targeted at all 
times.  Others could in effect choose the time and place of their 
vulnerability, even as they planned a return to the fray.  Each change 
threatened to destabilize LOAC. 
 
76. See Oscar Schachter, The Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 309, 316 (1989) (arguing that use of force against terrorist bases was 
appropriate under international law).  After September 11, the United Nations Security 
Council urged states to use a range of means, including force if necessary, against terrorist 
groups planning deadly attacks.  See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373, at 2 (Sept. 28, 
2001); William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S. 
Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 678–79 (2003); Chesney, supra note 45, at 5 
(outlining the different circumstances where states might find a need to use deadly force); 
Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 244–46 (2011).  But see Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with 
Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW 
GOVERNING ETHICAL FORCE IN CONTEXT 11 (Simon Bronitt ed., forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 (arguing for strict test of self-defense). 
77. See MARGULIES, supra note 5, at 14–23; CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE 
RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 138–39 (2007); cf. GOLDSMITH, supra note 43, at 106–10 (recounting by Bush 
administration official who in 2003 sought to modify aggressive legal opinions underlying 
policies).  On military commissions, see Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, 
Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1259–60 (2002) (criticizing 
administration’s approach). 
78. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 34–35, 54 (stating that recruiters, trainers, 
financiers, and weapons providers should be protected from targeting except for times when 
they directly participate in hostilities); cf. Watkin, Opportunity Lost, supra note 17, at 643–44 
(describing ICRC’s guidance as a proposed change in the law). 
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III.  UTILITARIANS AND PROTECTIVE THEORISTS 
The issues prompted by the rise of non-state actors in armed 
conflicts have attracted two very different normative and descriptive 
outlooks.  One is utilitarian, while the other I call protective.  I discuss 
each in turn. 
A.  The Utilitarian View 
The hallmark of utilitarian approaches to LOAC is a reliance on 
concrete reciprocity as the glue holding together the normative 
framework.79  When a party can retaliate for another party’s wrongs—
for example, the killing of captives—utilitarians believe that law will 
accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number.  However, 
utilitarians deride more diffuse brands of reciprocity that supplant 
specific retaliation with a broader commitment to habits of deliberation.  
For utilitarians, these intangible commitments are at best pie in the sky, 
and at worst a dangerous distraction.80 
 
79. See Eric A. Posner, Terrorism and the Laws of War, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 423, 427–30 
(2005) (focusing on prospects for enforcing IHL); see also James D. Morrow, The Institutional 
Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties, 55 INT’L ORG. 971, 979–80 (2001) (considering the 
role of culture and governance as well as reciprocity); cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE 
UNBOUND, supra note 20, at 158–59 (deriding much of human rights law as unenforceable 
because of absence of reciprocity); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 
58 (2009) (invoking Bentham’s utilitarian skepticism about courts as mediating institutions).   
80. The utilitarian treatment of the measured American response to the Cuban Missile 
Crisis is illustrative.  The United States decided on a blockade, rather than an all-out attack 
recommended by senior military officers, in part because of Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy’s view, ultimately shared by President Kennedy, that the latter course would have 
lowered the United States’ reputation.  See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A 
MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 31 (1969) (recounting Kennedy’s passing a note to 
his brother, the President, after listening to arguments for an air attack on Cuba, that said, “I 
now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor”); cf. Peter Margulies, When to 
Push the Envelope: Legal Ethics, the Rule of Law, and National Security Strategy, 30 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 642, 670–72 (2007) (analyzing American response to missile crisis).  The 
utilitarian account discounted reputational costs and efforts at minimizing violations of 
international law as drivers of the United States approach and stressed the role of American 
concessions to Russia, including shutting down a base in Turkey.  See GOLDSMITH & 
POSNER, supra note 20, at 178.  The utilitarian approach described here is merely one brand 
of utilitarianism, which other scholars have deployed to address intangible benefits that 
accrue to states through compliance with international law.  See GUZMAN, supra note 36, at 
212–13 (focusing on role of reputation in ensuring compliance); cf. WALZER, supra note 38, at 
247–50 (suggesting that “supreme emergency” justified Britain’s bombing of German 
population centers while outcome of World War II and Britain’s survival were in doubt); 
Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 40–55 (2010) 
(suggesting that IHL, after incorporating appropriate institutional and substantive safeguards 
that considered intangible costs, should recognize “necessity” as basis for violating norms, for 
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Utilitarians’ embrace of concrete reciprocity and their wariness of 
intangible incentives for compliance dovetails with two related 
attributes: deference to leaders of strong democracies, such as the 
United States, that have the military might to retaliate and skepticism 
about constraints imposed on those leaders by domestic or international 
law.81  Utilitarians believe that powerful states and those who run them 
will promote the general welfare over time, while non-state actors will 
only hinder beneficial state efforts and, in so doing, exacerbate 
collective-action problems that only powerful states can manage.82  
Unfortunately, utilitarians fail to appreciate that the absence of 
constraints on states also destabilizes LOAC. 
Utilitarians have some distinct advantages.  First, they have a 
methodological toolkit that includes concepts like signaling,83 collective-
action problems,84 and path dependence.85  Second, their substantive 
concerns are perennial issues in LOAC that have only become more 
pressing with time.  Excusing violent non-state actors from compliance 
with rules governing the wearing of insignia, for example, can lead to 
more violence, just as utilitarians predict in mourning reciprocity’s 
declining relevance.86 
However, utilitarians concerned that asymmetries favor terrorists, 
have tacked to the other extreme in granting strong states too much 
leeway.  In the process, utilitarians misplace their methodological 
toolkit.  Distrusting external constraints, utilitarians place excessive trust 
 
example, when officials were reasonably certain that only torture of suspected terrorist could 
save thousands of lives). 
81. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 20, at 64–65, 158–59 
(expressing skepticism about both domestic judicial review and countries’ adherence to 
international law). 
82. See id. at 159 (warning about “[a]dvocates of world constitutionalism”). 
83. See id. at 123 (observing that through “institutional mechanisms that impose heavier 
costs on ill-motivated actors than on well-motivated ones, the well-motivated executive can 
credibly signal his good intentions and thus persuade voters” who cannot independently 
research the issues); cf. POSNER, supra note 35, at 18–27 (discussing signaling in legal, 
commercial, and personal relationships). 
84. See Posner, Welfarist Approach, supra note 9, at 495–99 (arguing that humanitarian 
intervention is often difficult because each country regards human rights elsewhere as public 
goods that offer no concrete benefit).   
85. See VERMEULE, supra note 79, at 108–10 (criticizing path-dependence in common 
law caused when atypical facts form backdrop for decision). 
86. Cf. Posner, supra note 79, at 433–34 (discussing difficulty of reaching agreement with 
Al Qaeda on ground rules for conflict because of lack of reciprocity and symmetry). 
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in policymakers’ prudence.87  Crises have a habit of making prudence 
seem expendable, as officials demonstrated in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11 by seeking drastic modifications of IHL rules regarding 
detention, interrogation, and trial.88  Receiving such unsettling signals, 
more cautious officials and other stakeholders such as the courts and the 
military redressed the balance.89  Citing the path dependence that 
utilitarians criticize in other contexts, one of the officials who pushed 
back in these debates has suggested that the executive’s unilateral 
moves immediately after 9/11 produced a backlash that less extreme 
initial decisions could have controlled.90  In sum, utilitarians—so adept at 
 
87. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 20, at 174 
(discussing the executive’s advantages in foreign affairs). 
88. See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS 
LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 2–3 (2007); RANETA LAWSON MACK & MICHAEL J. KELLY, 
EQUAL JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE: AMERICA’S LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE EMERGING 
TERRORIST THREAT 2–3 (2004); cf. MARGULIES, supra note 5, at 36–42 (discussing coercive 
interrogation).   
89. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (striking down legislation that 
purported to limit federal courts’ jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus brought by 
detainees); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006) (holding that President Bush could 
not unilaterally establish military commissions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509–10 
(2004) (holding that Congress’ passage of Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) after September 11, 2001, that authorized detention of presumptive United States 
citizen apprehended in Afghanistan violated due process safeguards); cf. MARGULIES, supra 
note 5, at 63, 159–60 (detailing the roles of Jack Goldsmith, who withdrew aggressive opinions 
written by John Yoo of Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, and of State 
Department officials such as John Bellinger, Matthew Waxman, and Philip Zelikow who 
fought against the continuation of coercive interrogations); OSIEL, supra note 7, at 342–45 
(discussing role of military lawyers in contesting policies on interrogation); Gregory S. 
McNeal, Organizational Culture, Professional Ethics and Guantánamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 125, 129–34 (2009) (discussing culture of opposition to political influence within 
military).  But see Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: 
A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1820–23 (2007) 
(criticizing dissent by military officials as posing tension with civilian control).   
90. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 43, at 139 (arguing that if executive had complied with 
minimal Geneva Convention requirements in the twenty months after September 11, it would 
have “avoided the more burdensome procedural . . . requirements that became practically 
necessary under the pressure of subsequent judicial review”); cf. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER 
AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 117–78 (2012) 
(observing that revelations about abuses by U.S. personnel at Abu Ghraib in April, 2004, 
influenced U.S. Supreme Court decisions curbing executive power).  The executive’s role has 
been contested since the Founding Era; sources consulted by the Framers often favored a 
more modest role than the one suggested by either utilitarian commentators or subsequent 
practice.  See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 
(2008) (examining Founding Era interpretations of the role of a “commander in chief”); cf. 
David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 501–05 (2008) 
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discerning free riding in others—are free riders in disguise, coveting the 
prudence that constraints promote in others while rejecting those 
constraints themselves. 
B.  The Protective Paradigm 
Unlike the utilitarian view, the protective model regards concrete 
reciprocity as woefully inadequate as a basis for enforceable norms.  
Protective theorists rightly acknowledge that more diffuse incentives, 
including a commitment to justice, are necessary for core LOAC goals 
like establishing a floor for the treatment of captives.91  However, 
protective theorists’ fervor for imposing constraints on states typically 
exceeds their commitment to constraining violent non-state actors.92  
This asymmetry threatens to destabilize LOAC and enhance risks for 
civilians. 
A strength of the protective approach is that it provides an ironclad 
approach to state obligations once an adversary is in state custody.  
Advocates of the protective paradigm note that all detainees, including 
those allegedly from non-state actors such as Al Qaeda, are entitled to 
the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, 
including the right to be free from torture and the right to trial with 
appropriate procedural safeguards.93  Any other result would create a 
gap favoring states’ use of harsh tactics that might appear expedient in 
the short run, but that would ultimately erode the credibility of a party 
to a conflict.  The protective model is also correct that continued 
detention of alleged members of Al Qaeda requires ongoing review of a 
detainee’s current dangerousness.94  No theorist of the protective 
 
(noting that, by the time of the framing, political and military leadership were often 
divorced). 
91. See Jelena Pejic, “Unlawful/Enemy Combatants:” Interpretations and Consequences, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 39, at 335, 348; cf. OSIEL, supra 
note 7, at 368–69 (arguing for a more diffuse form of reciprocity that hinges on maintaining 
the system of international law). 
92. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 53 & n.123 (placing limits on state targeting 
of violent non-state actors such as bomb makers); Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between 
Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831, 
865–66 (2010) (defending the ICRC’s guidance limits on targeting non-state actors, “one 
causal step” removed from direct hostilities, by comparison to contractors hired by state 
actors). 
93. See Pejic, supra note 91, at 339; cf. Bellinger & Padmanabhan, supra note 4, at 233–
36 (discussing continuing issues regarding detention).  
94. See Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and International Law 
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approach could ever trivialize legal advice approving coercive 
interrogation, as utilitarian theorists have done.95 
However, protective theorists who eagerly speak truth to state 
power are less interested in addressing the proclivities of violent non-
state actors.  Portions of Additional Protocol I give those using arms 
against “colonial domination and . . . racist regimes” leeway to reject 
wearing identifiable insignia.  The drafters of Additional Protocol I 
made this move even though traditional groups of partisans, like Tito’s 
guerillas in World War II Yugoslavia, were able to operate effectively 
by generally complying with a broader version of the insignia 
requirement.96  Protective theorists also pushed for the ICRC changes 
that allowed violent non-state actors with key combat roles to claim 
immunity from targeting at most places and times, while subjecting state 
forces to continuous risk. 
 
in the United States, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 135, 148–49 (2008) (criticizing Bush 
administration’s minimalist framework for administrative review of Guantanamo detention).  
One can also read Rona as questioning whether a state has any power to detain civilians 
participating in terrorism outside of detention for those awaiting deportation or trial.  See id.  
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, Guantanamo detainees 
now are entitled to habeas corpus to determine, at the very least, whether they were at the 
point of capture part of Al Qaeda or associated forces.  The Obama administration also has 
fashioned a more robust administrative process to determine current dangerousness and 
assess the point-of-capture status of detainees in Afghanistan and elsewhere.  See Al Alwi v. 
Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding detention of individual who had 
received training in Al Qaeda camp and joined Taliban combat unit); see also Al Maqaleh v. 
Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that U.S. district courts lacked jurisdiction 
over detainees in Afghanistan); cf. Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military 
Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 770–71 (2011) (analyzing continued 
questions about scope of habeas authority); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 53–55 (2009) (stating that the law of war permits 
detention of civilians indirectly assisting combatant groups); Matthew C. Waxman, 
Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, 17–23 (2009) (reviewing the possibility of flexibility in administrative 
detention). 
95. See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Op-Ed., A ‘Torture’ Memo and Its Tortuous 
Critics, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2004, at A22 (describing aggressive legal memos as “standard 
lawyerly fare, routine stuff”).  
96. See Schmitt, supra note 52, at 405.  In World War II, allied forces worked closely 
with partisan fighters who often, but not always, wore identifying items of clothing such as 
armbands.  Pushing the insignia envelope in this fashion poses a tension with traditional 
LOAC requirements.  However, World War II partisans used this tactic primarily to target 
strategic objectives such as factories and rail lines.  Indeed, such attacks were often more 
precise than the aerial attacks also used by allied forces against the Axis powers, and resulted 
in fewer civilian casualties, thus promoting the principle of distinction.  See W. Hays Parks, 
Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 493, 526–36 (2003).  Using 
disguise to facilitate lethal force against opposing forces or civilians is far more problematic.   
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More to the point, the protective theorists’ focus on curbing states 
reflects an idealized version of warfare that does not match present-day 
challenges.  In an otherwise thoughtful piece, one commentator 
revealed this skewed vision by offering the example of insurgents’ attack 
on a military base.97  The commentator’s nominal point—that insurgent 
attacks on military targets should not, without more, be labeled as 
terrorism98—was undoubtedly correct.  However, the use of this 
particular example was telling.  States, particularly strong democracies 
such as the United States, would be in a fortunate position if the violent 
groups they have confronted in recent years limited themselves to 
straightforward attacks on military installations.  However, organized 
armed groups have rarely accepted such limits.  More often, they have 
used disguise to get close to a military target in a fashion that violates 
LOAC, as the Lebanese group Hezbollah did in its 1983 suicide car-
bomb attack on the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut.99  Or they have 
used disguise to facilitate the use of indiscriminate lethal force against 
civilians, as the 9/11 attackers did.  Terrorist networks also embed their 
infrastructure within civilian arenas to avoid retaliation.100  While giving 
conventional insurgents “incentive[s] . . . to respect international 
humanitarian law”101 is a plausible project, the same enterprise seems 
quixotic when a group’s business plan entails wholesale rejection of 
LOAC norms.102  Idealized examples do little to help the victims of such 
groups’ tactics. 
Protective theorists’ lack of realism about terrorist networks extends 
to their proposals for addressing the threat posed by Al Qaeda’s ability 
to move across borders.  For protective theorists, criminal prosecution is 
not merely an important tool,103 it is the only game in town.104  Protective 
 
97. See Pejic, supra note 91, at 353–54. 
98. Id. at 354. 
99. See William C. Banks, A Second Nuclear Age?, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 429, 431 
(2007). 
100. See Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare? Part I: Defender Duties 
Under International Humanitarian Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 425, 431–37 (2011) (arguing that 
viewed ex ante, unduly rigid restraints on governments defending civilians from terrorist 
groups enhance incentives for terrorists to plan attacks and conceal themselves within civilian 
populations).  
101. Pejic, supra note 91, at 354. 
102. Doubts about the prospects of enticing terrorist networks into the IHL fold do not, 
however, justify states’ abandonment of IHL norms.  Id. (noting applicability of Geneva 
Common Article 3 protections against torture and unfair trials). 
103. See James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the 
Federal Courts: 2009 Update and Recent Developments, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 267, 267–
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theorists also often view human rights law as paramount, even when 
tribunals and scholars have viewed IHL as occupying the field.105  Core 
norms are the same in both bodies of law regarding the treatment of 
detainees,106 but they vary widely regarding state targeting options.  The 
human rights domain generally contemplates the arrest of lawbreakers, 
including suspected terrorists.107  The use of lethal force against a 
suspected terrorist would under human rights law be an extrajudicial 
execution.  When conflict reaches a particular level of intensity, 
however, requiring the arrest of a fighter and a disposition in a civilian 
court is impracticable under human rights law. 
Protective theorists also, with greater acuity, seek to limit both the 
geographic scope of armed conflicts and the encroachment on other 
sovereign states of targeting efforts.  For protective theorists, non-
international armed conflicts should by definition stay within the 
territorial confines of a single state.108  Moreover, targeting terrorist 
networks in any other state should require that state’s consent.  Limits 
of this kind arguably minimize civilian casualties, given that any lawful 
targeting can include collateral damage to civilians, as long as that 
damage is proportionate to the military objective achieved.  Such limits 
also protect sovereign prerogatives.  However, both of these claims are 
contestable.  Terrorist networks that set up camps in adjacent or remote 
countries do so to facilitate further attacks on civilians in countries that 
oppose them.109  Moreover, remote camps also endanger local civilians, 
particularly because terrorists frequently kill those they suspect of 
 
68, 270 (2009) (concluding that federal courts can try suspected terrorists efficiently); see also 
Prosecuting Terrorists; Civilian and Military Trials for GTMO and Beyond: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. On Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 24 (2009) (remarks of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I.) (same). 
104. See O’Connell, supra note 76, at 11 (arguing that drone attacks coordinated by 
intelligence agents violate international law); see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of 
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on 
Targeted Killings, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (same). 
105. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8); DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 13, at 23–25; 
Schmitt, supra note 4, at 821. 
106. See DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 13, at 24. 
107. See O’Connell, supra note 76, at 26. 
108. See id. at 25–26 (evaluating Pakistan’s role in U.S. drone attacks on its citizens). 
109. See Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A 
“Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. 
REV. 46, 66 (2009). 
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disloyalty or lack of cooperation.110  Sovereign states unable or unwilling 
to control terrorist camps within their borders have failed a crucial test 
of sovereignty, namely preventing harm to other states emanating from 
their territory.  In the face of these concerns, the protective argument 
seems less like a sustainable principle, and more like a fear of slippery 
slopes that can be addressed through appropriate safeguards. 
IV.  A STRUCTURAL VIEW OF LOAC 
The difficulties of the utilitarian and protective approaches suggest 
the need for a structural approach.  While utilitarians view unilateral 
state action as necessary and protective theorists see NGOs as the 
starting point for innovation, a structural view would look to the 
sustainability of initiatives rather than their origin.  On this account, 
changes in LOAC result from a two-level game.111  Level 1 features 
dialogue and debate among domestic institutions, including the 
executive branch, the military, and the courts.112  Level 2 includes 
interaction among strong states and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs).  Utilitarians tend to believe that both games should be over 
before they start, as state leaders elbow out other domestic institutions 
and face down transnational interlopers.  Protective theorists have their 
 
110. See Lorna McGregor, Beyond the Time and Space of Peace Talks: Re-Appropriating 
the Peace Process in Sri Lanka, 11 INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 39, 45 (2006) (noting that as of 2006, 
Tamil Tigers (LTTE) of Sri Lanka continued to “assassinate its political opponents, extort 
taxes, recruit children into its forces, [and] attack the Muslim community within the territory 
it controls”); see also Erica Chenoweth et al., Correspondence: What Makes Terrorists Tick, 
INT’L SECURITY, Spring 2009, at 180, 185 (noting that LTTE sought dominance among Tamils 
through killing of members of rival factions); cf. Algeria Tries to Avert Terrorism During 
Ramadan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1997, at A3 (discussing violence by terrorist groups against 
civilians, as well as government violence in response); Michael Humphrey, Violence, Voice 
and Identity in Algeria, 22 ARAB. STUD. Q. 1, 6 (2000) (same). 
111. See Putnam, supra note 24, at 436; see also Joel P. Trachtman, International Law 
and Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 
11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 127, 131–34 (2010) (discussing role of domestic politics in state compliance 
with international law, although leaving aside other institutions such as courts). 
112. Students of comparative politics recognize that domestic constituencies can alter 
foreign policy in unexpected ways.  For example, consider the tendency toward irredentism in 
post-Iron Curtain Eastern Europe, in which states freed from Soviet domination wished to 
reunite with members of the state’s dominant ethnic group in neighboring states.  Irredentism 
can give rise to bitter violence.  However, a countervailing factor is the dominant group’s fear 
of immigrants, who could include their fellow ethnics, as well as other members of the second 
state’s population.  Political leaders who would otherwise take their country into war over 
irredentist sentiment must consider this opposing position.  See STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN & R. 
WILLIAM AYRES, FOR KIN OR COUNTRY: XENOPHOBIA, NATIONALISM, AND WAR 40–41 
(2008). 
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own form of tunnel vision: they see the Level 2 game as a one-way 
affair, with NGOs gradually weaning impulsive states from their 
irresponsible ways.113 
A structural account would stress that LOAC changes occur because 
the games are fluid and interoperative, with domestic institutions like 
courts and the military learning from NGOs.  Similarly, NGOs must 
accommodate unified state positions.  Changes in law can start from 
either level. 
New norms can crystallize through state practices with subsequent 
ratification by an international body.  Consider the intervention in 
Kosovo by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).  NATO’s action was problematic under positive international 
law because the United Nations Security Council had not approved 
NATO’s campaign,114 and NATO’s members did not act in self-
defense.115  Some NGOs criticized the intervention on these grounds or 
as leading to disproportionate deaths among civilians.116  However, other 
NGOs praised NATO’s move.117  After the conclusion of NATO’s 
 
113. Putnam is ambivalent on this point.  Compare Putnam, supra note 24, at 429–30 
(discussing “policy shift being demanded of . . . [the] country internationally”), with id. at 
435–36 (acknowledging that in bilateral negotiations between United States and another 
country, each side plays the two-level game).  Liberal and constructivist theories of 
international law tend to be unidirectional in tone if not substance, stressing how 
transnational actors such as NGOs can influence the policies of the United States and other 
nations.  See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 897 (1998); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to 
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 639–43 
(2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 
2602–03 (1997) (book review). 
114. See U.N. Charter art. 53. 
115. See Id. art. 2, para. 4.  Critics of humanitarian intervention argued that it would 
multiply regional conflicts and provide a cover for aggression by stronger countries.  See 
Louis Henkin, Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT 
CENTURY 383, 400 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994).  The State 
Department’s Legal Adviser did not assert that international law authorized the intervention 
in Kosovo, but found that the decision was “justifiable and legitimate” in light of the 
circumstances.  See David R. Andrews, The Clinton Administration—David R. Andrews 
(1997–2000), in SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 113, 125 (Michael 
P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams eds., 2010).   
116. Cf. Sloane, supra note 59, at 50–51 (expressing concerns about Kosovo campaign).  
But see Schmitt, supra note 4, at 823 (arguing that use of precision-targeting technology 
alleviated concerns). 
117. See Judith Miller, NATO’s War Aims; The Test: Getting the Refugees Home, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/25/weekinreview/the-world-nato-s-
war-aims-the-test-getting-the-refugees-home.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (quoting 
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campaign, the Security Council endorsed the terms that Serbia had 
accepted.118  The Security Council’s measure, which required the 
approval of permanent members such as Russia that had initially 
opposed the intervention, in effect ratified NATO’s efforts.  While some 
continued to view NATO’s action as illegal, others viewed it as justified 
by the exigencies of the situation.  Scholars and international 
organizations argued that the intervention heralded recognition of 
nations’ “responsibility to protect” vulnerable minorities from mass 
violence.119 
The two-level game can predict which initiatives from either source 
prosper, while others wither on the vine.  State initiatives in a utilitarian 
vein that lack domestic institutional support at Level 1 will trigger 
unified NGO opposition at Level 2, failing the test of sustainability.  The 
converse applies for NGOs’ protective initiatives, which need support 
from Level 1 stakeholders.  Without such support, they encounter 
unified opposition from strong states and yield fragmentation among 
NGOs.  Contests at both levels hinge on two elements displayed to 
varying degrees by states, NGOs, and armed non-state actors: linear 
time horizons and holistic signaling. 
A.  Linear Time Horizon 
While the horizon in humans’ sight is fixed by the laws of nature and 
perspective, individuals’ time horizon reveals alarming discontinuities.  
Perceptions of time display pervasive flaws in human inference and 
judgment.120  Chronic cognitive myopia, sometimes called presentism, is 
 
director of Physicians for Human Rights as asserting that failure to protect refugees from 
Kosovo conflict might discourage future “intervention to save peoples’ [sic] lives”). 
118. See S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (calling for “rapid” 
and “complete” Serbian withdrawal).   
119. See Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 
24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 703, 713–15 (2006).  However, scholars tend to locate this responsibility in 
the Security Council, which will often decline to act because of divergent interests among its 
members.  As a consequence, the legal basis for intervention absent Security Council 
authorization remains uncertain.  See Paul R. Williams & Meghan E. Stewart, Humanitarian 
Intervention: The New Missing Link in the Fight to Prevent Crimes Against Humanity and 
Genocide?, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 97, 105–06 (2007–2008).  Nevertheless, a 
“responsibility to protect” did become more salient in United Nations discourse and 
operational practice after the Kosovo intervention.  See Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through 
the Operational Activities of International Organizations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 87, 
94–100 (2008). 
120. The following account is based on material in an earlier article.  See Peter 
Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the 
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a constant of the human condition: people fixate on short-term factors 
and neglect the long-term.121  Perceptions of time track the vantage point 
of the self-absorbed New Yorker in the Saul Steinberg cartoon: the gap 
between today and tomorrow is huge, like the artist’s rendering of the 
distance between New York and New Jersey.122  The difference between 
tomorrow and next year is modest, emulating the cartoon’s depiction of 
New Jersey as virtually next door to the Pacific Ocean.  In other words, 
people’s temporal discounting function is higher than it should be, with 
the present getting a disproportionate share of attention. 
Some social scientists have refined this model, positing that 
individuals suffer from “projection bias.”  In other words, people view 
current tastes as fixed, underestimating how their tastes will change in 
the future.123  When a salient or visceral factor, such as hunger, shapes 
one’s current preferences, the individual will overestimate the duration 
and continued dominance of this state.124 
Left to the perils of their flawed inferences, individuals make bad 
decisions.  For example, studies have shown that people will decline 
even manifestly profitable investments because of wariness of relatively 
modest up-front costs.125  Studies also tell us what we already know: 
people happily engage in self-destructive behaviors such as substance 
abuse that yield short-term benefits at the price of long-term dangers.126  
 
Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 204–11 (2010). 
121. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical 
Review, in TIME AND DECISION, supra note 27, at 13, 32–34; see also Loewenstein & Angner, 
supra note 27, at 353–54 (people tend to underestimate the degree of change between current 
and future tastes, in part because they view current tastes as “objective”); Jolls et al., supra 
note 26, at 45–46; Laibson, supra note 26, at 450; Streich & Levy, supra note 25, at 205; cf. 
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control, 96 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1449, 1457–62 (2006) (discussing saving and consumption patterns); Nira Liberman & 
Yaacov Trope, Construal Level Theory of Intertemporal Judgment and Decision, in TIME AND 
DECISION, supra note 27, at 245, 247–56 (discussing distortions in intertemporal judgment). 
122. See Jeanne English Sullivan, Copyright for Visual Art in the Digital Age: A Modern 
Adventure in Wonderland, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 563, 616–17 (1996) (describing 
Steinberg’s cartoon as depiction of New Yorkers’ myopic view of the world).    
123. See Loewenstein & Angner, supra note 27, at 372–73. 
124. Id. at 370–73. 
125. See James J. Choi et al., $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) 
Plans, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 748, 761 (2011) (noting that large cohort of people fail to 
allocate optimal amount to retirement plans, despite availability of employer match and 
significant increase in size of asset and that most members of this cohort reveal comparable 
patterns for other assets and decisions). 
126. See, e.g., Drazen Prelec, Decreasing Impatience: A Criterion for Non-stationary 
Time Preference and “Hyperbolic” Discounting, 106 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 511, 513 (2004) 
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Indeed, as the substance abuse example reveals, sometimes even 
calculating costs a couple of hours in the future, such as the risks of 
driving while intoxicated, can overload humans’ tattered temporal 
judgment. 
People can remedy these flaws, but only with conscious planning.127  
Just as the Greek hero Ulysses had his crew bind him to the mast so he 
could resist the sirens’ serenade and continue his journey,128 people 
fashion devices that correct for flaws in temporal judgment.  For 
example, financial planners tell people to set up savings accounts and 
diversify their portfolios.  The purchase of insurance is another hedge 
that entails people binding themselves in the present to stave off long-
term harms.  Moreover, presentism is less pronounced in practice and in 
neural imaging when subjects make decisions on behalf of others, rather 
than themselves.129  Vicarious decisionmaking apparently reduces the 
emotional content of such decisions, leaving more space for 
deliberation.  This finding suggests that a proxy decisionmaker, at least 
one without a competing agenda, may better balance present and future 
costs and benefits. 
Because human inference is a creature of both anticipation and 
memory, distortions in the time horizon also affect perspectives on the 
past.  People impute current knowledge to past selves,130 producing what 
cognitive psychologists call hindsight bias.  Because of hindsight bias, 
people overstate the probability that a party could have prevented a 
particular harm.131  Vivid harms color assessment of the acts or omissions 
 
(explaining procrastination). 
127. See Laibson, supra note 26, at 444. 
128. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY 36 (1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140–45 (1986). 
129. See Konstanze Albrecht et al., What Is for Me Is Not for You: Brain Correlates of 
Intertemporal Choice for Self and Other, 6 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
218, 218, 224 (2011). 
130. See Loewenstein & Angner, supra note 27, at 372. 
131. See Fischhoff, supra note 27, at 342 (“Consider decision makers who have been 
caught unprepared by some turn of events and who try to see where they went wrong . . . .  If, 
in retrospect, the event appears to have seemed relatively likely, they can do little more than 
berate themselves for not taking the action that their knowledge seems to have dictated.”); 
see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 26, at 95, 95 (stating that maxims such as 
“hindsight . . . is ‘20/20’” indicate that “[l]earning how the story ends . . . [distorts] our 
perception of what could have been predicted”); Neal J. Roese, Twisted Pair: Counterfactual 
Thinking and the Hindsight Bias, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION 
MAKING, supra note 26, at 258, 260–61 (hindsight bias is “the tendency to believe that an 
 
18 - MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:27 PM 
1448 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1417 
preceding the harm.132  This “anchoring” of perceptions to vivid past 
events has broader implications for human inference.133  When a referee 
at an athletic event sees a player throw a punch, for example, the referee 
is likely to infer that the player he saw commit the offense bears 
responsibility for the altercation.  In fact, however, that player’s punch 
could have been the culmination of interactions throughout the game.134 
Maintaining the habits of deliberation that accompany a linear time 
horizon has always been central to the laws of war.  While leaders and 
thinkers have agreed for millennia that war may sometimes be 
necessary, observance of LOAC can cultivate the habits of 
“moderation” that eventually make peace possible.135  In contrast, the 
failure to observe these rules usually heralds a conflict of wider scope 
and longer duration. 
The law on surrender illustrates the importance of rules in fostering 
habits of dialogue and deliberation.  The law of war has long prohibited 
 
event was predictable before it occurred, even though for the perceiver it was not”).  
132. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Governance, in BLACKWELL 
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 26, at 567, 575–76 
[hereinafter Rachlinski, Heuristics and Governance]. 
133. On anchoring, see Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Anchoring, Activation, 
and the Construction of Values, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 115, 144 (1999); Daniel Kahneman et al., Economic Preferences or Attitude 
Expressions? An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND 
FRAMES 642, 665–68 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); cf. Florian Fessel & 
Neal J. Roese, Hindsight Bias, Visual Aids, and Legal Decision Making: Timing Is Everything, 
5 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 180, 181 (2011) (noting that because of 
hindsight bias, individual who learned that colleague had been fired would remember events 
that were consistent with this fact, such as colleague’s lateness, as opposed to neutral or 
inconsistent data, such as positive evaluations or customer good will); Rachlinski, Heuristics 
and Governance, supra note 132, at 569 (noting significant increase in subjects’ perceived 
need to take precautions once researchers told subjects that flood with 10% likelihood of 
occurrence in given year had actually happened). 
134. For an intriguing study of officiating in sports and its relevance to judgments in law, 
see Mitchell N. Berman, “Let ‘Em Play”: A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, 99 GEO. L.J. 
1325, 1330–31 (2011), which supports a meta-rule that would discourage calling fouls late in 
basketball games and that would rely more on course of dealing among players; see also W. 
Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental 
and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 300 (1998) (discussing the problem of hindsight bias in 
juries).  But see CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED 
DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 3–4 (2001) (arguing that jury verdicts 
in product liability cases are not excessive); cf. Fischhoff, supra note 27, at 348 (noting the 
tendency of historians to assemble tidy narratives, “with all the relevant details neatly 
accounted for and the uncertainty surrounding the event prior to its consummation 
summarily buried”). 
135. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667 (1863).  
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killing captives in large part because the short-term expedients that 
drive this extreme measure can have dire long-term consequences.  As 
one commentator noted centuries ago: “Should the sovereign conceive 
he has a right to hang up his prisoners as rebels, the opposite party will 
make reprisals . . . the war will become cruel, horrible, and every day 
more destructive to the nation.”136  Customary international law, such as 
the immunity of ambassadors and the inviolability of safe conduct 
pledges, emerged from the same premise of promoting habits of 
deliberation among nations.137 
An ex ante view that considers incentives for coordination in 
avoiding needless violence is vital to LOAC.138  Changes in the law must 
reflect realism about parties’ inclination and capacity to take advantage 
of the incentives provided.  Incentives that fail to elicit the conduct 
envisioned have opportunity costs, discouraging more productive 
measures.  Failing to address those opportunity costs is itself a form of 
temporal misjudgment. 
War, like the other aspects of the political landscape well known to 
the Framers, requires structures that promote pre-commitment to 
thought in lieu of hasty action.  The Framers understood the need to 
anchor political deliberation to structure.  In justifying judicial review, 
Alexander Hamilton cautioned against the political branches’ tendency 
to act on the impulses of the moment.139  James Madison, exhibiting an 
equally refined understanding of the dangers of a distorted time 
horizon, dryly observed that “indirect and remote considerations . . . will 
rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in 
disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole.”140  LOAC 
is also an effort to prevent such distortions; as Michael Walzer aptly 
described them, the laws of war are “constitutionalism in hell.”141 
Central to war’s constitutionalism are what I call identification 
norms.  Identification norms include jus in bello principles such as 
 
136. Id.; see also SOLIS, supra note 49, at 8–9, 18 (discussing how soldiers who decline to 
surrender and continue to fight in the face of certain defeat ratchet up violence). 
137. See BELLI, supra note 48, at 81 (discussing diplomatic immunity); cf. Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723–24 (2004) (noting that diplomatic immunity was regarded 
in Founding Era as a cornerstone of customary international law).   
138. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 132 (quoting philosopher Henry Sidgwick on 
avoiding “the danger of provoking reprisals and of causing bitterness that will long outlast” 
hostilities). 
139. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 28, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton). 
140. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 28, at 56 (James Madison).   
141. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 47. 
18 - MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:27 PM 
1450 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1417 
distinction, which requires care in distinguishing an adversary’s forces 
from civilians.142  Criteria for interrogation, detention, and trial of 
members of an adversary’s forces would also fit into this category.  
Rules barring coercive interrogation, for example, are necessary in part 
because norms on detention and trial would be meaningless if a party 
could use coercion to extract an admission that would fit whatever 
criteria applied.143 
American courts have long found ways to directly or obliquely 
accommodate identification norms that inform temporal judgment in 
armed conflict.144  By invoking norms that required the government to 
make careful determinations about persons and property subject to 
seizure, the Court has ensured that short-term calculations would not 
overwhelm long-term values.  In a landmark early decision that set the 
interpretive tone, the Court held that the executive, absent clear 
direction from Congress, could not violate the law of nations by seizing 
neutral vessels on the high seas.145  The Court also required that the 
executive precisely follow Congress’s instructions on the appropriate 
time and place for seizure.146  In addition, the Court barred the executive 
from seizing enemy property absent express direction from Congress.147  
 
142. See Pejic, supra note 91, at 342 (rejecting the notion of an “intermediate” category 
that is neither combatant nor civilian). 
143. Identification norms include not only rules governing the use of force on others, but 
also criteria for how those using force should distinguish themselves.  See supra note 12 and 
accompanying text (discussing wearing of insignia); supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text 
(discussing signaling). 
144. See Golove, supra note 29, at 562–63; David Weissbrodt & Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, 
The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Interpreting and Developing Humanitarian 
Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1344 (2011) (noting the Supreme Court’s recognition of the law 
of war shortly after the Court’s inception). 
145. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 72 (1804); see also 
Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the 
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 487 (1998); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, 
Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 
B.C. L. REV. 293, 302 (2005) (explaining the Charming Betsy Canon); cf. Peter Margulies, 
Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure After 
September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 402–06 (2004) (arguing that courts should interpret 
statutes authorizing force as being consistent with international humanitarian law). 
146. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804); David J. Barron & Martin 
S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, supra 
note 90, at 947. 
147. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 115–16 (1814) (ordering relief from 
official’s attempt during War of 1812 to condemn as enemy property cargo on vessel 
chartered by British company); see also Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President’s Power to 
Detain “Enemy Combatants”: Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison’s Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. 
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In Ex parte Milligan, the Court held that United States citizens who 
were not belligerents could not be tried in military commissions, at least 
when civilian courts were open.148  At the turn of the twentieth century, 
the Court held that customary international law barred seizure of 
coastal fishing vessels typically used by civilians for subsistence.149  In 
many of these cases, the Court’s decision relied on interpretive default 
rules that Congress could overcome, rather than on categorical 
declarations.  However, these rules still have bite because overcoming 
inertia triggers costs that Congress is not always ready to bear.150 
The post-September 11 cases have continued this focus on 
identification norms.  In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court struck down 
legislation that stripped Guantanamo detainees of access to habeas 
corpus, expressly citing the importance of preserving the government’s 
temporal judgment from the “pendular swings” that listing from crisis to 
crisis can yield.151  The Boumediene Court questioned the reliability of 
 
L. REV. 1567, 1597–98 (2004) (discussing Brown). 
148. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 106 (1866). 
149. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900); cf. William S. Dodge, The Paquete 
Habana: Customary International Law as Part of Our Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STORIES 175, 195–96 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that Paquete Habana decision 
reflected robust role of customary principles).  Utilitarians have singled out The Paquete 
Habana for special criticism, asserting that it offered a stilted and selective account of state 
practices contributing to customary international law.  See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra 
note 20, at 71–72 (asserting that Britain had attacked coastal fishing vessels during Crimean 
War).  But see Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 699–700 (vessels attacked by British-supplied 
enemy troops and were not intended for subsistence); Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: 
National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. 
L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2008) (arguing that British attacks may have stemmed from breakdown of 
discipline among British and allied forces, not policy decision). 
150. See Dodge, supra note 149, at 195–96 (arguing that the Paquete Habana Court 
would have been reluctant to permit unilateral executive disregard of customary principles).  
See generally EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET 
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 163–65 (2008) (discussing importance of default rules that allocate 
burden of overcoming legislative inertia in light of Guantanamo detainees). 
151. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742, 771 (2008); cf. Martin S. Flaherty, 
Constitutional Resolve in a World Changed Utterly, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 575, 578–80 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011) 
(discussing robust judicial review in war on terror cases); Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without 
Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165, 1183–86 (discussing importance of habeas as check on 
political branches); Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in 
the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 301, 303–05 (2009) (arguing that judicially imposed 
rules are necessary to compensate for short-sighted executive policies); Joseph Landau, 
Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. 
REV. 661, 663–67 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court has used procedural rulings in 
terrorism cases to police interaction between the branches); Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE 
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administrative processes to adjudicate a detainee’s status.152  The D.C. 
Circuit’s jurisprudence on criteria for detention has required reliable 
evidence that a detainee is part of Al Qaeda or associated groups, 
demonstrated through proof of attendance at training camps and 
association with Al Qaeda or the Taliban in maneuvers in 
Afghanistan.153  Courts have held that targeting decisions by the United 
States military are political questions.154  However, a case on the alleged 
targeting of an American citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi, whom the 
government had identified as a leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, found that the targeting presented a political question only 
after discussion of the basis for the government’s view.155 
The law of war also takes hindsight bias into account.  Consider the 
principle of proportionality, which requires that attackers avoid 
excessive collateral damage in achieving a military advantage.156  The 
principle does not specify any precise ratio of civilian deaths to military 
success.  As a manual by three noted commentators observed, 
“[P]roportionality is not an exact science and it is impossible to draw in 
 
DAME L. REV. 2107, 2125–35 (2009) (discussing historical background for judicial review).  
But see Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, in THE SUPREME COURT 
REVIEW 225, 225–27 (2010) (questioning impact of post-September 11 court decisions 
regarding national security measures); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War 
on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1015–17 (2008) (same).   
152. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 784 (noting that, in an administrative process, “the 
detainee’s opportunity to question witnesses is likely to be more theoretical than real”). 
153. See Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 13–14, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding 
detention of individual who had received training in Al Qaeda camp and joined Taliban 
combat unit); Chesney, Who May Be Held?, supra note 94, at 845–47; Matthew C. Waxman, 
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1411–12 (2008); see also BENJAMIN WITTES, DETENTION AND 
DENIAL: THE CASE FOR CANDOR AFTER GUANTÁNAMO 143–44 (2011) (arguing for 
codification of detention policy); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the 
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1087–89 
(2008) (discussing dialectic between fairness and efficiency in models of adjudication).  But 
see Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving 
Beyond the Armed Conflict–Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369, 411–12 (2008) (arguing 
that administrative detention should be permissible, but that conduct such as participation in 
a training camp does not constitute a sufficiently serious threat to justify detention). 
154. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 559 F.3d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
155. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010) (describing 
government’s view that al-Aulaqi had been complicit in the shooting of military personnel at 
Fort Hood and other recent terrorist plots).  The court also found, in ruling that al-Aulaqi’s 
father lacked standing, that the alleged target had an adequate opportunity to come forward 
to contest the government’s claims.  See id. at 17; cf. Chesney, supra note 45, at 8–11 
(analyzing Al-Aulaqi). 
156. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, arts. 52, 57. 
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advance hard and fast rules.”157  Moreover, while the principle requires 
an attacker to act consistently with “reasonable expectations,” it does 
not fault an attacker when a military success turns out to be less 
sweeping than planned or damage exceeds diligent estimates.  Only a 
viewer infected with hindsight bias would penalize attackers because the 
“‘fog of war’” caused a disparity between reasonable expectations and 
often unpredictable outcomes.158 
B.  Holistic Signaling 
Institutions that promote sound temporal judgment would be of 
little use without the means to communicate those judgments to others.  
In a world of imperfect information and faulty inference,159 each party 
relies on signals that provide otherwise unavailable information about 
the other’s specific intentions and general dispositions.160  Signaling is 
particularly important when a party wants to convey sincerity to others, 
either to promote a common enterprise or avoid a conflict.161  Signaling 
that is misunderstood or deceptive undermines common projects and 
prompts needless friction.162  The fluid nature and high stakes of armed 
conflicts combine to make signaling crucial. 
 
157. SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.1.1.4 cmt. 5. 
158. Id. at cmt. 4.  Of course proportionality also acknowledges the risk of myopia; its 
central purpose is to ensure that attackers weigh apparent strategic or tactical advantages 
against cost to innocents.  In the heat of battle, decisionmakers may pay less attention to the 
latter concern, which is why the principle is necessary. 
159. See James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Explaining Interethnic Cooperation, 90 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 715, 718–19 (1996) (noting that on local level members of one ethnic 
group usually have ample informal sources for information about those from the same group 
but little information about members of other groups, making cooperation difficult). 
160. See POSNER, supra note 35, at 18–20; Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount 
Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 674–75 (2001) (book 
review).  
161. For example, a sincere exchange of conciliatory gestures between two warring 
factions can help each develop a shared stake in the design and operation of governing 
institutions.  See Matthew Hoddie & Caroline Hartzell, Signals of Reconciliation: Institution-
Building and the Resolution of Civil Wars, 7 INT’L STUD. REV. 21, 35 (2005) (acknowledging 
that beneficial spiral results only when parties share desire for reconciliation).   
162. See Robert Jervis, Deterrence and Perception, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1982/1983, 
at 3, 6–7 (suggesting that Germany and Japan both misunderstood signals sent by allied 
powers before World War II, and that allied powers did not consider how their signals would 
be perceived); John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International 
Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of 
State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1, 94–95 (1997) (noting that misunderstood signals can 
produce spiraling tensions between nations, as when one country conducts naval exercises 
which another interprets as an aggressive move—when the second country acts against the 
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Signals come in two varieties: transactional or holistic.  A 
transactional signal seeks to provide information to another party about 
a particular situation.  In contrast, a holistic signal, while it may arise in 
a particular context, tries to convey information about the underlying 
habits and dispositions of the sender.  In LOAC, both kinds of signals 
are necessary. 
As an example of a transactional signal, consider the white flag of 
surrender.  A fighter who flies the white flag is signaling that he will 
forego hostilities in exchange for being captured instead of being killed.  
If parties to an armed conflict did not recognize this signal, the attacking 
party would lack the reassurance that it needs to stop its attack.  
Moreover, the white flag of surrender is what theorists call a “costly 
signal.”163  The sender incurs opportunity costs, because flying the white 
flag requires that the sender simultaneously give up the chance to kill 
more of his opponents.  Incurring this cost is a token of the sender’s 
sincerity.164  The receiver, who in the heat of battle cannot conduct a 
more extended analysis of the sender’s sincerity, accepts the white flag 
as a proxy. 
Holistic signaling does not hinge on reciprocity in a narrow sense, 
but rather on a party’s recognition that it participates in a system of 
shared understandings.165  While transactional signaling is bilateral in 
nature, holistic signaling is multilateral.  A party may not benefit from 
holistic signaling in the short term, if its adversary in an armed conflict 
does not reciprocate.  For example, Al Qaeda would not hesitate to 
harm captives, even if the United States at all times refrained from 
doing so.  In the real world, however, no conflict is ever purely bilateral.  
Failure to comply with LOAC yields externalities, as a state’s reputation 
declines.166  Multilateral implications are rife in global counterterrorism 
 
perceived aggression, the first country must retaliate). 
163. See James D. Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus 
Sinking Costs, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 68, 69–71 (1997) (arguing that leaders signal their 
resolve to enemy states by upping the ante with their base, for example by making statements 
such as “[t]his will not stand” that would trigger discredit if leader backs down). 
164. This principle has long antecedents: Cicero extolled the duty to keep agreements 
with the enemy and to avoid deceptions such as using a spy to poison an enemy leader.  See 
BELLI, supra note 48, at 88. 
165. See OSIEL, supra note 7, at 384–86; Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 113, at 897; 
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 113, at 642.  
166. See GUZMAN, supra note 36, at 212–13; Christopher J. Borgen, Hearts and Minds 
and Laws: Legal Compliance and Diplomatic Persuasion, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 774–78 
(2009); David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 879, 879, 881–82 n.17 (2003). 
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efforts.  A state combating terrorism needs allies in the ranks of foreign 
leaders, transnational organizations, and global publics.  Holistic 
signaling yields benefits in this more spacious arena.167 
Major state players, such as the United States, signal not only their 
own dispositions but their commitment to the overall LOAC 
framework.  This systemic signaling has been a cornerstone of American 
law since the Founding Era.  The Constitution expressly empowers 
Congress to make laws defining violations of the law of nations168 and 
courts to hear cases involving foreign diplomats.169  Congress in 1789 
granted federal courts jurisdiction over torts in violation of the law of 
nations.170  The Supreme Court during this period adopted a canon of 
interpretation to avoid conflicts between legislation and international 
law.171  These measures went far beyond the narrowly instrumental 
calculations of those who wished to avoid foreign entanglements.172  The 
chief players of the Founding Era also saw the United States, with its 
distinctive system of judicial review, as a model for governance with 
global impact.173  American innovations that won approval from global 
audiences could exert a positive influence on customary international 
law, while heedless decisions could adversely affect the progress of self-
governance.  By publicly practicing habits of deliberation, the United 
States sent a message to other states that cultivating such habits is 
worthwhile.  Later leaders like Lincoln and Roosevelt stressed the 
United States’ role in promoting more equitable governance throughout 
 
167. A state conducting counterinsurgency operations elsewhere in the world will also 
often be prudent to tailor a policy to address concerns of the local population, even if IHL 
does not require this accommodation.  See Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on 
Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1803 (2009) (discussing importance of 
winning over populations in counterterrorism efforts); Philip Zelikow, Legal Policy for a 
Twilight War, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 89, 95 (2007) (arguing that legal policy on interrogation 
and related issues must consider need to attract and retain international allies); cf. Gabriella 
Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 163, 166 (2011) (asking whether, by 
virtue of its international position and ubiquitous need to persuade, the United States should 
be held to higher standard). 
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
169. Id. art. III, § 2. 
170. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712–13 (2004). 
171. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
172. Cf. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law 
of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 447–48 (2011) (taking instrumental view of statute’s 
purpose, while conceding that little concrete evidence of legislative intent exists).  
173. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 196–97 (1963) (quoting John Adams and 
James Wilson, and Thomas Paine, who compared the Constitution to examples from 
antiquity, such as Greece and Rome). 
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the world.174  The United States’ founding role in the United Nations 
manifested this same intent.175 
Holistic signaling is in the interest of the United States today in a 
more tangible respect.  Because America has participated in military 
intervention when nations’ commitment to the rule of law breaks down, 
as in Kosovo and Libya, the United States has a vested interest in 
enhancing the appeal of the global rule of law so that it can reduce calls 
for its military capabilities.  Moreover, American military personnel 
developing relationships with their counterparts count on that 
reputation as a crucial signal of their discipline and professionalism.176  
American defection from global rules—particularly those venerable 
norms embedded in customary international law—therefore has ruinous 
consequences not merely for the global system, but for America itself.  
Because the United States has a stake in the integrity of the 
international system,177 it cannot isolate the benefits it may receive from 
 
174. Lincoln described emancipation as “an act of justice” consistent with the 
“considerate judgment of mankind.”  See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Emancipation Proclamation 
(Jan. 1, 1863), in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28, 30 (Roy P. Basler ed., 
1953); cf. FONER, supra note 61, at 237 (noting Lincoln’s belief that emancipation was “the 
last best, hope of earth”); Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of 
International Human Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550, 560–95 (2008) (discussing Britain’s 
special role in antebellum evolution of international law regarding slavery); see also Mark R. 
Shulman, The Four Freedoms: Good Neighbors Make Good Law and Good Policy in a Time 
of Insecurity, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 555–56 (2008) (discussing Franklin Roosevelt’s 
articulation of freedoms to guide a post-war era, including freedom from want and freedom 
from fear).  America’s role as an example for the world is a durable element of popular 
constitutionalism, connoting narratives that the public embraces independent of specific 
judicial approval.  See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 24–25, 45–46 (2004) (discussing public opinion 
on constitutionality of acts and Jefferson’s approval of public role in “supervising 
constitutional law”); cf. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1185, 1204 (noting that, in Founding Era debate over Alien and Sedition Acts, “constitutional 
meaning was hammered out informally through political contestation”); Larry Alexander & 
Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1599–1615 (2005) 
(book review) (analyzing arguments for and against constitutional interpretation by people 
and elected officials). 
175. See Bush, supra note 66, at 2388–89 (discussing the United Nations’ endorsement 
with the United States and other countries of the theory of Crimes Against Peace).  Indeed, 
complaints about “American exceptionalism” when the United States does not ratify certain 
international agreements or participate in institutions like the International Criminal Court 
assume that United States participation will encourage other states to embrace these 
measures.  See Koh, supra note 113, at 2634. 
176. See OSIEL, supra note 7, at 299, 312–14. 
177. See Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1117, 1165–73 (2011) (discussing how the statute signals United States’ willingness to 
cooperate with international law).  
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defection, and cannot successfully free ride for long on disregard of 
international norms. 
Efforts to promote such free riding in a strong democracy falter 
because institutions such as courts insulate holistic signaling from 
executive whim.178  Courts view certain IHL norms, such as the 
prohibition on torture, as fundamental to their integrity.179  
Encroachment on those norms is a challenge to their institutional 
standing.180  These institutional concerns make courts tacit allies of 
NGOs and military lawyers committed to upholding IHL. 
V.  STRUCTURE IN CONTEXT: TIME HORIZONS AND HOLISTIC 
SIGNALING IN STATES, NON-STATE ACTORS, AND NGOS 
Now that we have identified the values of linear time horizon and 
holistic signaling as crucial, we can assess how players in our two-level 
game fare under these elements.  This Part considers states first.  It 
moves on to non-state actors and NGOs.  After this comparison, this 
Part takes up two proposed innovations: the Bush administration’s 
attempt to deprive suspected terrorists of IHL protections and the 
ICRC’s effort to change rules on targeting non-state actors participating 
in hostilities. 
 
178. See Trachtman, supra note 111, at 130–31 (describing “polyarchy” in domestic 
players on international law); Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International 
Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 210–11 (2004) (describing how disaggregated 
government entities facilitate the recognition of international law in the United States).  But 
see Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797, 
800–02 (2005) (questioning whether courts and NGOs have sufficient motivation and 
cohesion to uphold IHL norms). 
179. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897); R v. Warickshall, (1783) 
168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B.) 235; 1 Leach 262.  For more context on coercion and abuse of 
prisoners and detainees, see JOHN T. PARRY, UNDERSTANDING TORTURE: LAW, VIOLENCE, 
AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 142–45 (2010) (discussing Cold War interrogation tactics, 
conducted with consent of senior officials); Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 265–66 (2004). 
180. The Supreme Court’s trenchant observations in its war-on-terror cases demonstrate 
this institutional commitment.  See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 609 (2006) 
(noting that defendant in military commission proceeding was charged with general support 
of Al Qaeda, not specific acts, such as the use of dogs to terrorize detainees, linked to both 
notorious Civil War military prison commandant Henry Wirz and post-September 11 
government policies); see also MARGULIES, supra note 5, at 41 (describing use of a dog in the 
interrogation of Mohammed al-Qahtani); Pearlstein, Justice Stevens, supra note 22, at 1307–08 
(discussing Justice Stevens’ view of military honor and best practices, based on his experience 
in World War II and as a Supreme Court clerk after the war assisting Justice Wiley Rutledge 
in review of cases alleging United States overreaching in that conflict). 
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A.  Comparing the Actors 
1. States: Promise and Disappointment 
It should be no surprise that on each axis states are most promising, 
yet also most disappointing.  States can develop institutions that protect 
a linear time horizon and promote holistic signaling.  However, these 
advantages are not predestined; they must be earned through the 
continued commitment to deliberation.  Temptations to defect from that 
commitment can easily diminish states’ advantages.  If, as one scholar 
has observed, states should enjoy a “rebuttable presumption that [they] 
will act in accordance with international norms,”181 experience has 
shown that state critics will often readily carry their burden of proof. 
States’ initial advantage is constitutive: states by definition exist in 
space and time in a way that other entities may not.  A state 
policymaker stands for “an entire community” that has developed over 
time, not merely for an inflated snapshot of instantly aggregated 
individual preferences.  In states, “[o]ver a long period of time, shared 
experiences and cooperative activity of many different kinds shape a 
common life.”182  Even in an undemocratic regime, constituencies from 
the cultural, religious, or business realms may on occasion counter the 
narrative of the day.183 
Despite this promise, however, states’ track record is mixed, at best.  
Consider the record of the United States during and since World War II.  
On the one hand, American policy reflected unusual forbearance.  
Despite entering the war because of aggression by others, the United 
States complied with IHL in its treatment of POWs.  This commitment 
preserved the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and “notably” 
contrasted with the atrocities committed against American POWs in the 
Pacific theater.184  However, other elements of American policy are 
 
181. Schmitt, supra note 39, at 174. 
182. WALZER, supra note 38, at 54.  Of course, particular regimes can conduct 
themselves with utter disregard for the lives of their constituents.  See id. (“If no common life 
exists, or if the state doesn’t defend the common life that does exist, [the state’s] own defense 
may have no moral justification.”). 
183. See Lionel K. McPherson, Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?, 117 ETHICS 524, 541–
42 (2007) (discussing de facto checks and balances in nondemocracies); cf. POSNER & 
VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 20, at 178 (noting that even in a dictatorship, 
“there will almost always be political forces the dictator(s) must be careful to reward or 
appease, such as the military or security services, mass public opinion, or an elite ‘selectorate’ 
that influences the choice of dictators” (footnote omitted)).   
184. See Morrow, supra note 79, at 990.   
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murkier.  While international law is still unclear, the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki had consequences that American and other 
strategists would not wish to repeat.185  Scholars have also criticized 
American rules of engagement in Vietnam as leading to unnecessary 
civilian deaths.186  The aftermath of September 11 produced yet more 
tensions with IHL.187  If the United States strikes a better balance 
today,188 one should acknowledge that this turn was not automatic or 
foreordained.  Other regimes have also revealed a spectrum of 
responses to the challenges of transnational terrorism, ranging from 
brutality to nuance.189 
 
185. Compare Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 263 (July 8) (declining to rule out use of nuclear weapons in self-defense), 
with Blum, Lesser Evil, supra note 80, at 2, 56–57 (arguing that bombings were “indisputably 
war crimes” under present view of IHL, but that a carefully calibrated utilitarian test might 
justify decisions if alternatives such as use of conventional bombs would have cost even more 
civilian lives).  On the home front, as well, American officials surrendered to myopia.  See 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–18 (1944) (upholding statute that required 
Japanese-Americans to leave their homes during World War II); see also Ex parte Endo, 323 
U.S. 283, 285, 294–97 (1944) (helping to end internment program by holding that Congress 
had not granted the government authority to detain concededly loyal Japanese-Americans); 
cf. Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1934 (2003) (discussing 
significance of Endo); Joseph Margulies, Evaluating Crisis Government, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 
627, 638–39 (2004) (discussing other World War II-era restrictions targeting Asian-Americans 
and Pacific Islanders, including imposition of martial law in Hawaii). 
186. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 188–90.  The United States’ support for 
authoritarian governments, typically justified on short-term pragmatic grounds, has injured its 
reputation.  Cf. DAN SAXON, TO SAVE HER LIFE: DISAPPEARANCE, DELIVERANCE, AND 
THE UNITED STATES IN GUATEMALA 103–05 (2007) (discussing United States backing for 
abusive regime in Guatemala as bastion against drug cartel); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Are We 
Safer from Terrorism? No, but We Can Be, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 419, 431–32 (2010) 
(arguing that United States support for authoritarian regimes in Middle East thwarted efforts 
to build good will). 
187. See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON 
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 7–8 (2008). 
188. See Letter from David H. Petraeus, Gen., U.S. Army, to Multi-National Force-Iraq 
(May 10, 2007), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/torture/2009/02/general-
petraeus-what-sets-us-apart.asp (noting crucial role of United States forces’ compliance with 
legal norms). 
189. Compare Jon Lee Anderson, Death of the Tiger: Sri Lanka’s Brutal Victory over Its 
Tamil Insurgents, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, at 41, 47 (detailing the Sri Lankan 
government’s campaign against Tamil Tigers, which cost the lives of thousands of civilians), 
with Julio S. Amador III, National Security Challenges of the Philippines Under the Aquino 
Administration: A Human Security Approach 7–8 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1752622 (discussing the blend of reconciliation and targeted force 
used by the Philippine government against insurgents). 
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2. Non-State Actors: Virtue and Vice 
Non-state actors lack states’ presumptive advantages in temporal 
judgment and signaling.  Some non-state actors can cultivate greater 
temporal and signaling capacities because they control territory and 
seek to participate in state governance.190  Networks such as Al Qaeda, 
which aspire to transnational reach, have fewer incentives to modify 
their signaling and temporal judgment.  Change is difficult for each non-
state group, however, particularly when groups start with a core strategy 
of inflicting mass casualties on an adversary’s civilian population. 
Both territorial groups and networks suffer from a paucity of 
institutions, such as courts or an organized opposition party, that can 
straighten out time horizons.  Non-state actors frequently adapt secrecy 
as a strategy.191  Secrecy can dilute checks and balances in democratic 
states192 and has similar effects on non-state actors.  While emerging 
non-state actors embrace a more transparent and interactive ideal that 
leverages social media,193 groups that insisted on secrecy as a standard 
operating procedure developed more monolithic institutions that 
suppressed debate.  Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers, for example, evolved into 
a cult of personality that acted on a charismatic leader’s caprices.194  Al 
Qaeda leaders function in a similar echo chamber.  When secrecy skews 
debate, decisionmakers view moderation as betrayal.  Targeting 
moderates creates a positive feedback loop within the group that 
exacerbates violence.195 
Secrecy also skews non-state actors’ signaling.  A group that views 
secrecy and deception as essential will ignore norms that require visible 
 
190. See OSIEL, supra note 7, at 283; Klotz, supra note 10, at 463–64. 
191. See HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 179–80. 
192. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 579–80 (2d Cir. 2009) (invoking secrecy as a 
distinction that may “amount to a special factor counseling hesitation” in expansion of 
damages claims against government officials for extraordinary rendition). 
193. See Blake Hounshell, The Revolution Will Be Tweeted: Life in the Vanguard of the 
New Twitter Proletariat, FOREIGN POL’Y, July/Aug. 2011, at 20, 20.   
194. See Anderson, supra note 189, at 43. 
195. See Andrew H. Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, The Strategies of Terrorism, INT’L 
SECURITY, Summer 2006, at 49, 72–74; see also Abrahms, supra note 42, at 85–86 (observing 
that terrorist groups rarely pursue compromise and typically act as spoilers); cf. ALIZA 
MARCUS, BLOOD AND BELIEF: THE PKK AND THE KURDISH FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE 
286–91 (2007) (discussing violence by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)); Anderson, supra 
note 189, at 47 (discussing violence against moderate leaders by Tamil Tigers); Thomas C. 
Schelling, What Purposes Can “International Terrorism” Serve?, in VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, 
AND JUSTICE 18, 21 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991) (citing the violent 
“campaign of militant Palestinians against moderate Palestinian leaders”). 
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insignia.  For many violent non-state actors, concealing a fighter in 
civilian clothes to gain a lethal advantage is not a war crime—it’s a job 
description.196  Similarly, while LOAC bars targeting an adversary’s 
civilians, many non-state actors view killing civilians as a useful signal 
that even those offering attenuated support for a regime are vulnerable.  
For many non-state actors, targeting civilians signals commitment to the 
cause to followers, peers, and possible funders.197  Like the counsels of 
moderation, a turn to LOAC signaling norms would be a betrayal. 
As another demonstration of skewed signaling, violent non-state 
actors also often view dealings with states and NGOs as further 
opportunities for strategic advantage.  Groups such as the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), Hamas, and Hezbollah regularly use truces and 
negotiation to prepare for renewed violence.198  Violent non-state actors 
divert or leverage humanitarian aid to support future violence.199  
Rwandan genocidaires received aid that subsidized continued 
operations,200 and the Tamil Tigers channeled food aid from NGOs to 
families that provided child soldiers.201  Non-state actors also use NGOs 
 
196. See PAPE, supra note 11, at 62–63 (in operational terms, groups such as Hamas and 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) view suicide bombing as one role among many).  
197. See Abrahms, supra note 42, at 100. 
198. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729–30 (2010) (justifying 
restrictions on assistance to foreign terrorist organizations because of organizations’ history of 
manipulating such aid); MARCUS, supra note 195, at 286–95; see also Catherine Collins, Kurd 
Violence Rises in Turkey, Raising Fears of a Renewed War, CHI. TRIB., May 18, 2005, at C6 
(discussing return to violence by groups associated with PKK after end of truce); Ayla Jean 
Yackley, 20 Injured in Turkish Resort Bomb, IRISH TIMES, July 11, 2005, at 11 (noting the 
explosion of bomb for which militant wing of PKK claimed responsibility, that the bomb 
injured over 20 people, including at least one critically, and that came after unilateral truce 
declared by PKK).  See generally Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe 
Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455 (2012) (discussing terrorist groups’ 
tendency to game system). 
199. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2727, 2729–30. 
200. See FIONA TERRY, CONDEMNED TO REPEAT?: THE PARADOX OF 
HUMANITARIAN ACTION 15–16 (2002) (terming humanitarian aid “potential source for 
exploitation” by armed groups); Michael Barnett, Evolution Without Progress? 
Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt, 63 INT’L ORG. 621, 651 (2009) (noting that 
humanitarian group Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders or MSF) withdrew 
from camps serving genocidal Hutu fighters because “humanitarian assistance was prolonging 
suffering, not alleviating it”). 
201. See Peter Popham, Tamil Tigers Break UN Pledge on Child Soldiers, INDEP. 
(London), Feb. 4, 2000, at 18 (reporting that LTTE only allowed families to receive 
humanitarian aid if “one or more family members perform a service,” including service as a 
child soldier); cf. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 48 (2011), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/report/31-international-conference-ihl-challenge 
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and international organizations to mask their commitment to violence.  
The PKK has used United Nations-supervised refugee camps as sites for 
recruitment and mobilization,202 while Hamas provided misleading 
information to U.N. investigators on the percentage of its fighters 
among casualties in the 2008–2009 Gaza campaign.203 
Again, this depiction does not represent all non-state actors.  In the 
Philippines, for example, a number of Islamic rebel groups have entered 
into good-faith negotiations, and the government has reciprocated by 
granting these groups a measure of autonomy.204  The ANC worked with 
international organizations and NGOs to reform governance in South 
Africa, and has maintained that commitment.205  Former Irish 
Republican Army officials entered into a unity government with 
Protestants in Northern Ireland.206  Mediation efforts, in which both the 
government and the non-state stakeholders participate in a common 
project of reconciliation, have had encouraging results.  However, these 
efforts require costly signals from both sides.  Governments cannot 
unilaterally retreat from such shared projects without losing credibility.  
Similarly, non-state actors that embark on a shared project with the 
government cannot claim so readily that their adversaries’ civilians 
merit killing. 
In other areas, however, terrorists’ tactics have been remarkably 
shortsighted.207  The Tamil Tigers failed in their effort to secure 
independence, despite a campaign that costs tens of thousands of lives.208  
The Algerian terrorist group foundered because it targeted moderates 
indiscriminately.209  The second Intifada badly misread the signals in 
 
s-report-2011-10-31.htm (warning that sweeping attempts to restrict terrorist groups’ 
diversion of humanitarian aid can impede flow of aid to civilians). 
202. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2729–30. 
203. See Ethan Bronner & Jennifer Medina, Investigator on Gaza Was Guided by His 
Past, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, at A4. 
204. See Amador, supra note 189, at 6–7. 
205. See Klotz, supra note 10, at 463–64. 
206. See Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Research on Terrorism and Countering 
Terrorism, 38 CRIME & JUST. 413, 437 (2009) (discussing how successful negotiations in 
Northern Ireland ended terrorism there). 
207. See Max Abrahms, Why Terrorism Does Not Work, INT’L SECURITY, Fall 2006, at 
42, 56–60 (arguing that terrorist tactics such as targeting civilians harden positions on the 
other side, thus frustrating strategic goals).  But see PAPE, supra note 11, at 64–73 (asserting 
that suicide bombing is successful, based on Hamas strategy that appears less effective in light 
of later events). 
208. See Anderson, supra note 189, at 47, 48. 
209. See Humphrey, supra note 110, at 8–9 (discussing how indiscriminate violence in 
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Israel, believing that a spate of renewed attacks on civilians would bring 
Israel back to the negotiating table; Hamas made a similar mistake when 
Israel withdrew from Gaza.210  These episodes show the difficulty of 
inculcating compliance with LOAC in non-state actors formed in 
secrecy and committed to violence against civilians. 
3. NGOs: The Watchdog’s Blind Spot 
NGOs have their own problems with temporal judgment and 
signaling.  While they perform an essential function in hedging against 
states’ myopia, this watchdog role carries the burden of hindsight bias.  
Moreover, despite their role in promoting state compliance with IHL, 
NGOs often lack the governance structures that would promote 
comprehensive internal debate about their own proposals.  Finally, 
NGOs, despite the best intentions, often send the wrong signals to 
violent non-state actors, putting more innocents at risk. 
NGOs’ central mission is holding in check states’ tendency to cut 
corners.  Left to their own devices, states would surely do great violence 
to LOAC’s fabric.  NGOs provide an organizational and rhetorical 
fulcrum for opposing efforts.211 
While NGOs’ scrutiny of state practices is salutary, their vantage 
point sometimes sinks into the overly comfortable recliner of retrospect.  
For NGOs, hindsight bias is a risk of the trade.  Like the basketball 
referee reacting to the player observed throwing a punch, a state’s 
action anchors the NGO’s assessment, crowding out scrutiny of factors 
that elicited the state’s response.  In keeping with the limits of the 
protective model’s perspective, NGOs often fail to consider the ex ante 
perspective on changes in rules.  They therefore miss the adverse effects 
of changes that increase protection for violent non-state actors. 
Consider the predicament of a military lawyer advising on targeting 
for a state signatory to the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions.  Article 44(3) of Additional Protocol I, if it is also 
customary law applicable to non-international conflicts, provides special 
protection to non-state actors who depend on secrecy and deception, by 
stating that in situations where secrecy is a tactical imperative, a 
combatant need not wear a distinguishing insignia.  Moreover, the 
 
Algeria means there are “no borders demarcating safe zones”). 
210. See Kydd & Walter, supra note 195, at 63, 74. 
211. See Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. 
“War on Terrorism,” 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 49–50 (2004). 
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combatant must carry arms openly, but only during a “deployment 
preceding the launching of an attack.”  Suppose that a state, in the midst 
of fighting that has already risen to the intensity of armed conflict,212 
knows of an imminent catastrophic attack that could cost scores of lives.  
However, the actual deployment preceding the attack has yet to begin.  
The state, acting in good faith, targets someone without an insignia 
whom it believes to be the leader of the planned attack.  That person 
turns out to be a civilian.  An NGO would criticize the state for possible 
violations of the principle of distinction, without recognizing that the 
dilution of the non-state actor’s duty to identify himself contributed to 
the state’s mistake.  Indeed, in at least one recent episode, NGOs and 
fact-finders appointed by an international organization inaccurately 
identified slain combatants as civilians and based criticism of a state on 
this erroneous determination.213  Such headlong rushes to judgment 
needlessly disturb the equilibrium on which IHL depends. 
 
212. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 566 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/ 
tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (“‘[T]he temporal and geographical scope of both internal and 
international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of hostilities.” (internal 
citation omitted)); id. at ¶ 568 (noting “scope and intensity” as criteria in determining 
whether Article 3 applied to an armed conflict). 
213. Compare United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human 
Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories (Goldstone Report), ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 15, 2009) (asserting that individuals at a targeted police station were not 
combatants, while acknowledging that many were members of Hamas), with Bronner & 
Medina, supra note 203 (quoting Hamas spokesperson as conceding that individuals at police 
station were Hamas fighters); see also Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts but Missing the Law: 
The Goldstone Report, Gaza and Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 279, 281–82 (2010) 
(criticizing factual and legal errors in Goldstone Report); Chris Jenks & Geoffrey Corn, Siren 
Song: The Implications of the Goldstone Report on International Criminal Law 3, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788542 (noting that Goldstone Report engaged in “ex post facto 
evaluation of targeting decisions . . . in contravention of a long established rule of war crimes 
liability” that requires “evaluation of targeting decisions . . . through the perspective of the 
military commander at the time the judgment at issue was made”).  NGOs rushed to endorse 
the Goldstone Report on its initial issuance, despite evidence at the time that the report 
relied on flawed sources.  Compare Press Release, Human Rights Watch, US: Endorse 
Goldstone Report on Gaza: Promote Justice for Victims on Both Sides (Sept. 28, 2009) 
(arguing against “[d]ismissal of all or part of the Goldstone report”), with Ellen Knickmeyer, 
Hamas Asserts Role in Suicide Bombing, WASH. POST., Feb. 6, 2008, at A14 (contradicting 
Goldstone Report by detailing claims by Hamas officials that Israeli attack on police station 
killed both police officers and members of Hamas’s military wing).  The sloppiness of the 
Goldstone Report undermined more diligent efforts to press for investigation of actual 
abuses.  See Ethan Bronner & Isabel Kershner, Head of U.N. Panel Regrets Saying Israel 
Intentionally Killed Gazans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, at 10 (discussing ongoing questions 
about Israeli forces’ targeting of a flour mill and problems in the Goldstone Report); cf. 
Isabel Kershner, Israel Rebukes 2 in Attack on U.N. Complex, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A4 
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The NGOs’ commitment to ratcheting down identification 
requirements also sends troubling signals to violent non-state actors.  
Because of the dilution of these requirements, violent non-state actors 
enjoy a win-win situation vis-á-vis both the state and moderates within 
their own community.  Violent acts by the state discredit moderates, 
because extremists can point to state overreaching and say, “I told you 
so.”214  Criticism of states by NGOs may chill future counterterrorism 
efforts, allowing extremists to argue that the concessions urged by 
moderates are unnecessary.215  Even when a state retaliates, terrorist 
networks can shift their operations to another state and evade capture.  
In this win-win scenario, violent non-state actors externalize the costs of 
their actions, allowing them to become free riders on protective changes 
to LOAC. 
NGOs that supply humanitarian aid to populations harmed by 
ongoing civil or international strife can also send unhelpful signals.  
International law currently requires that such aid—which often fills a 
desperate need—be effective: NGOs should seek to ensure that aid 
reaches its intended civilian recipients.216  When violent extremists on 
any side divert aid to fund ongoing violence, aid becomes 
counterproductive.  Many NGOs recognize this problem and try to put 
in place procedures that minimize diversion.217  However, as the 
aftermath of the Rwandan genocide demonstrated, NGOs often feel 
pressure from their own funders to be “first on the ground” with 
assistance, even if extremists divert significant portions of aid.218  Indeed, 
 
(discussing Israeli reprimands of senior officers who had directed firing of artillery that hit 
United Nations compound in Gaza).  
214. See Kydd & Walter, supra note 195, at 69–70. 
215. See id. at 62–63 (discussing how states’ concessions to terrorist organizations 
encourage more attacks); LaFree & Dugan, supra note 206, at 422 (discussing incentives for 
heightened violence in terrorist groups). 
216. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 14, arts. 23(2)(a)–(b) (permitting state 
corrective measures when state has “serious reasons for fearing” that “consignments may be 
diverted from their destination” or that controls limiting non-civilian access to aid will “not be 
effective”).  The ICRC Commentary on Article 23 highlights the “danger of 
misappropriation” of aid, observing that, “It is essential that consignments should be subject 
to strict and constant supervision from the moment they arrive until they have been 
distributed.”  See 4 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 182 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958). 
217. See DANIEL MAXWELL ET AL., PREVENTING CORRUPTION IN HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE 2 (2008), available at https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachment
s/15171916/Preventing+Corruption+in+Humanitarian+Assistance+Report+July+2008.pdf?ve
rsion=1&modificationDate=1219154461000. 
218. Cf. Taylor B. Seybolt, Harmonizing the Humanitarian Aid Network: Adaptive 
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NGOs sometimes argue that international law bars due diligence.219  This 
stance encourages violent extremists to divert aid, again making 
extremists free riders on proposed protective changes to legal norms.220 
NGOs’ deficits cancel each other out in one realm: humanitarian 
intervention.  In that domain, NGOs’ perennial interest in curbing 
human rights abuses balances its practice of second-guessing strong 
democracies.  While some NGOs have criticized earlier interventions, 
such as Kosovo,221 others have offered praise,222 and many have been 
muted in the criticism of both intervention and tactics that have been 
helpful in the intervention setting, such as targeted killing. 
4. Summary 
By establishing time horizon and holistic signaling as overarching 
norms, we can model sustainable change in LOAC.  States, NGOs, and 
non-state actors all have promise.  However, in particular contexts, each 
reveals grave deficits.  Sustainable change hinges on a balance between 
these three players.  Suppose that states believe that NGOs have swung 
too far toward the protective paradigm in proposing changes that 
increase a non-state actor’s ability to free ride.  Those changes will not 
be sustainable.  By the same token, when NGOs and domestic rule of 
law institutions believe that states have swung too far toward the 
utilitarian model, those changes will not stand the test of time. 
 
Change in a Complex System, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 1027, 1041 (2009) (describing wasteful 
competition among aid groups in Rwanda in 1990s). 
219. See Justin Fraterman, Criminalizing Humanitarian Relief: Are US Material Support 
for Terrorism Laws Compatible with International Humanitarian Law? 27 (Working Paper, 
Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1750963 (arguing that U.S. prosecution of 
aid workers for providing material support through humanitarian efforts would violate the 
United States’ obligations and prevent NGOs from fulfilling their obligations under the 
Geneva Conventions).  But see Harv. Univ. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research, Humanitarian Action Under Scrutiny: Criminalizing Humanitarian Engagement 8 
(Working Paper, Feb. 2011), available at http://c0186748.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/
HPCR%20CHE%202011.pdf (noting that international law “does not expressly mention a 
right of humanitarian organizations” to interact with non-state actors).  See generally 
Anderson, supra note 43, 843–44 (criticizing NGO practices). 
220. See Tamar Meisels, Combatants—Lawful and Unlawful, 26 LAW & PHIL. 31, 47–48 
(2007). 
221. See Paul W. Kahn, The Paradox of Riskless Warfare, 22 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 2, 2, 
4 (2002). 
222. See Goldstone, supra note 44, at 62. 
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B.  A Tale of Two Bookends: Coercive Interrogation and Direct 
Participation in Hostilities 
Armed with this model, we can now assess two significant post-9/11 
proposals for change.  The first is the government’s effort in the 
aftermath of the attacks to deprive suspected terrorists of IHL 
protections against coercive interrogation.  The second is the ICRC’s 
guidelines on targeting and direct participation in hostilities.  I address 
each in turn. 
1. Post-9/11 Proposed Changes to Interrogation Rules 
Utilitarians supported the move after September 11 by the Bush 
administration to deprive suspected terrorists of legal protections under 
LOAC.  The approach consisted of two steps.  First, Bush 
administration officials argued that Al Qaeda and the Taliban violated 
IHL because they do not wear insignias, use a fixed command structure, 
carry arms openly, or refrain from killing civilians.223  As a result, 
officials claimed, Al Qaeda and Taliban members were not entitled to 
POW status.  Second, administration lawyers decided in the months 
after 9/11 that no detainee qualified for protection under the Geneva 
Conventions’ Common Article 3.  According to the administration’s 
lawyers, Common Article 3, which applies to conflicts “not of an 
international character,” only governs conflicts within a particular 
country, such as civil wars.  Because Al Qaeda was a transnational 
organization that the United States was fighting on territory outside the 
United States, the conflict with Al Qaeda had an international character 
that precluded application of Common Article 3.224  In short, Bush 
 
223. See Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Atty. Gen., and Robert J. 
Delahunty, Special Counsel Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of 
Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 5, at 38, 50.  But cf. John F. 
Murphy, Is US Adherence to the Rule of Law in International Affairs Feasible?, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 39, at 197, 216 (offering an 
alternative view of whether this definition should have been applied to the Taliban, which 
contained members of the armed force of Afghanistan).  Some argued that until the Karzai 
regime took power in Afghanistan after the United States’ intervention, Taliban fighters were 
the armed forces of Afghanistan.  Since Afghanistan was a party to the Geneva Conventions, 
this argument went, Taliban fighters were entitled to POW status, after all.  Murphy, supra, at 
216.  Administration lawyers countered this argument by conveniently asserting that 
Afghanistan was a “failed state,” which could not be a party to the Geneva Conventions.  See 
Yoo, supra, at 48–52. 
224. See Yoo, supra note 223, at 46–47.  Afghanistan after 9/11 could have been involved 
in a civil war between the Taliban and pro-United States rebel forces, which would have 
qualified as a conflict “not of an international character” (NIAC).  However, the 
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administration officials sought to render IHL obsolete.225  Utilitarians 
who shared this impatience with constraints supported the government’s 
position.226 
This position encountered difficulties on at least two fronts.  First, 
the administration’s argument about POW status missed a step.  To 
determine POW status, the Geneva Convention requires more than an 
adverse party’s categorical determination.  A “competent tribunal” must 
decide if an individual has failed to meet IHL criteria for lawful 
combatancy.227  Second, the drafting history and purpose of Common 
Article 3 demonstrated that this provision established a floor for the 
treatment of all detainees, whatever the classification of the conflict in 
which they were captured.228  While utilitarians viewed these points as 
mere niceties, others viewed them as essential to the rule of law. 
The Bush administration’s legal maneuvers amounted to a 
substantial proposed change in IHL that would have allowed leaders of 
one state to summarily deprive non-state actors of legal protections.  
The change was suspect under both the time horizon and holistic 
signaling counts.  Domestic courts, while they have generally declined to 
rule on the propriety of the specific interrogation techniques used by the 
administration, wisely found that international law supplied a floor for 
detainee treatment.229  Without such a floor, governments will overreach, 
imposing needless harm230 and corrupting their own institutions.  An 
analysis of holistic signaling buttresses this conclusion.  Other states that 
must work together in counterterrorism efforts will view such results as 
lacking in legitimacy.  Moreover, developing states, including those with 
repressive governments or fragile democracies, will perceive the United 
States’ action as tacit authorization for their own coercive interrogation 
 
administration’s argument that Afghanistan was a “failed state,” id. at 50, 53–59, dictated the 
conclusion that the indigenous conflict did not include a party to the Geneva Convention and 
was therefore not a NIAC subject to Geneva rules. 
225. See Gonzales, Memorandum to the President, supra note 5, at 119. 
226. See POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE, supra note 20, at 274 
(criticizing opponents of expanded executive power as ignoring substance for process 
concerns). 
227. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 5. 
228. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006).  See generally Stephen Ellmann, 
The “Rule of Law” and the Military Commission, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 760, 781–86 (2007) 
(discussing Hamdan decision in light of rule of law). 
229. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631. 
230. See Philip Zelikow, Op-Ed, A Dubious C.I.A. Shortcut, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, 
at A27 (stating that information from interrogations using “enhanced” techniques was “a 
critical part of the intelligence flow, but rarely—if ever—affected a ‘ticking bomb’ situation”). 
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regimes.231  Finally, transnational publics will also doubt the legitimacy 
of counterterrorism efforts and limit their cooperation.232 
2. The ICRC’s Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities 
As a bookend to the Bush administration’s failed proposal, consider 
recent guidelines from the ICRC that define who may be targeted as 
directly participating in hostilities.233  The ICRC’s guidance adopted a 
protective approach that gave such participants an “on–off switch.”  In 
contrast, under traditional law of war concepts, uniformed state forces 
can be targeted at any time.  The ICRC’s proposed change disturbed the 
equilibrium of LOAC, and ultimately put both state forces and civilians 
at risk. 
The ICRC reached its conclusion through a narrow definition of 
“continuous combat function.”234  Those engaged in such functions can 
always be targeted.  However, others experience a far narrower window 
of vulnerability.  A narrow definition of “continuous combat function” 
therefore immunizes most non-state participants most of the time.  As 
an example, consider an individual who assembles the explosives used 
by suicide bombers.  According to the ICRC’s guidance, this individual 
could not be targeted as he assembled the bomb, since others would 
have to deploy it to actually produce harm.235  Even if the bomb maker’s 
work met this restrictive definition of causation, he could finish his task 
and evade targeting by passing through a “revolving door” to ordinary 
 
231. Cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, The International Standardization of National Security 
Law, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 437, 451 (2010) (arguing that global counterterrorism 
measures allow many states to camouflage their substandard governance as 
counterterrorism); Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for Terrorism, 
63 ME. L. REV. 131, 149–71 (2010) (analyzing policies in United States, United Kingdom, 
Israel, and India). 
232. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic 
Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833, 835–37 (2011) (arguing that focusing investigative 
resources on religious speech can be counterproductive); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and 
Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 365, 366–69 (2010) (discussing positive effects of perception of legitimacy on 
cooperation with law enforcement in antiterrorism policing). 
233. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 33–36.  
234. Id. at 33. 
235. See id. at 54 (asserting that the “assembly and storing of an improvised explosive 
device (IED) . . . do not cause . . . harm directly”); cf. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct 
Participation in Hostilities, supra note 17, at 731 (criticizing narrow view of causation in ICRC 
Guidance).   
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life.236  That tactical interlude would continue until the bomb maker 
turned again to his task, at a time and place of his choosing.237 
The ICRC’s guidance suffers from a time horizon skewed by 
hindsight bias.  The ICRC worried about the possibility of collateral 
damage if the bomb maker could be targeted at all times.  However, the 
ICRC focused only on the state attack and ignored all contributing 
events.  In particular, the ICRC’s guidance failed to reckon with the 
change’s effect on the ex ante perspective of the bomb maker and the 
organized armed group for which he worked.  Given an “on–off switch” 
to regulate his risk, the bomb maker has far less reason to abandon his 
dubious calling.  Moreover, the group supporting his work has stronger 
incentives to add to the bomb makers’ ranks. 
In addition to a substantively skewed time horizon, the ICRC 
displayed poor temporal judgment in its own internal deliberations.  
Consider the irregular process leading to announcement of the ICRC 
guidance.  The ICRC assembled an international group of experts to 
provide input.  However, when those experts declined to endorse the 
approach that ICRC officials desired, the ICRC decided to ignore the 
experts it had consulted.238  An organization with sounder temporal 
judgment would have discerned the myopia in elevating a particular 
outcome over respect for deliberative processes.  However, the ICRC 
apparently did not gain this insight. 
The ICRC’s signaling was equally flawed.  Because terrorist 
networks that use improvised explosive devices disdain insignias, the 
bomb maker is aiding and abetting killing through deception, an act of 
perfidy long condemned by LOAC.239  Escalating terrorist violence 
provides political cover for a harsh state response.  The ICRC’s 
approach, despite its benevolent aspirations, deepens the cycle of 
violence.240  While the ICRC acknowledged that it was merely expressing 
 
236. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 44, 70–72; cf. Watkin, Opportunity Lost, 
supra note 17, at 661 (criticizing ICRC’s enabling of revolving door mechanism). 
237. See Watkin, Opportunity Lost, supra note 17, at 658. 
238. See W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: 
No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 783–84 
(2010) (reporting that ICRC added pivotal section without consulting the experts it had 
convened, that a majority of experts proceeded to “vigorous[ly]” criticize the section, which 
was nonetheless included in the final document).   
239. See DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 13, at 233; Richard R. 
Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 323, 341–42 (1952). 
240. Cf. Kydd & Walter, supra note 195, at 69–70 (describing how provocation by 
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its own views,241 its approach to both substance and process made this 
disclaimer a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
VI.  TWO EMERGING ISSUES: DRONES AND NEW WAR CRIMES 
Beyond the book-ended issues of coercive interrogation and direct 
participation in hostilities, newer issues clamor for analysis.  To flesh out 
the structural model, I consider two: remote targeting of suspected 
terrorists and material support of terrorism as a war crime.  This Part 
discusses each in turn. 
A.  The Case of Remote Targeting 
The ICRC’s study on direct participation in hostilities only scratches 
the surface on targeting issues.  Adding to controversy is the United 
States’ recent practice of remote targeting.  Reports indicate that the 
United States has targeted at least one individual in Yemen, as well as 
others in Somalia, usually using unmanned drone aircraft.242  Remote 
targeting raises difficult questions on the nature of self-defense, the 
appropriate geographic scope of non-international armed conflict, the 
limits of sovereignty, and the intensity of violence necessary for 
persistence of an armed conflict.243  A structural approach would permit 
remote targeting, conditioned on observance of identification norms and 
other limits such as necessity.  Proxy compliance of this type is 
consistent with both time horizon and holistic signaling. 
Remote targeting poses tensions with LOAC norms.  It typically 
does not entail a response to the threat of imminent attack, and 
therefore fails the historic Caroline test for self-defense, in which 
 
terrorists pays off when states respond with hostility). 
241. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 6. 
242. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010). 
243. See Chesney, supra note 45, at 19–28.  Compare Kenneth Anderson, Targeted 
Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: 
AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346, 346–47 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009) (arguing that drone 
attacks, given appropriate constraints, are consistent with international law of self-defense), 
and Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 76, at 668 (same), and John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon 
Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 175, 189 (2011) (same), and Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-
State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 237, 274–79 (2010) (same), with U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on Targeted Killings, 
¶¶ 3–4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (targeted killings generally 
impermissible), and Dehn & Heller, supra, at 183, 196 (same), and O’Connell, supra note 76, 
at 2 (same). 
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Secretary of State Daniel Webster opined that the threat must be 
“instant, overwhelming, leaving . . . no moment for deliberation.”244  
While scholars have argued that imminence needs to be defined flexibly 
in the case of ideologically committed fighters,245 other objections to 
remote targeting persist.  By definition, remote targeting occurs within 
states that are not currently engaged in an international or internal 
armed conflict involving the targeting state.  As the protective theorists 
fear, authorizing targeting without geographic restraints could lead to 
“war everywhere.”246  Remote targeting also challenges sovereignty 
because it may proceed without the consent of the state in which the 
targeting takes place.  Finally, remote targeting raises issues about the 
intensity of armed conflict.  If violence occurs below a particular 
threshold, states should generally treat it as a law-enforcement matter, 
not an occasion for military action.  A proxy compliance framework 
addresses each of these concerns. 
The self-defense point is best addressed on the time horizon axis.  
While curbs on myopia often require constraints on the use of force, 
they do not support unduly rigid limits.  Particularly when an actor such 
as Al Qaeda has a clear track record of violence and has shown no 
interest in renouncing that strategy, waiting for further attacks to occur 
is a myopic strategy.247  These attacks may be imminent, or may require 
 
244. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Henry Fox, British Minister 
in Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-
1842d.asp#web1; cf. James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of 
the Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, 14 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 464–69 (2006) (discussing background and relevance of 
an early example of anticipatory self-defense).  The United Nations Charter arguably codifies 
the Caroline standard.  See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.  
245. See Schachter, supra note 76, at 312. 
246. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and 
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 761 (2004); 
O’Connell, supra note 76, at 26; see also CARTER, supra note 13, at 76–77 (stating that drone 
killings give President “breathtakingly broad” power).  But see Michael W. Lewis, A Different 
Case for Restraint, 45 TULSA L. REV. 751, 756 (2010) (book review) (stating that the narrow 
view of location of armed conflict is not required by international law). 
247. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote 
Address: The Obama Administration and International Law at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; cf. Nicholas Rostow, The Laws of War 
and the Killing of Suspected Terrorists: False Starts, Rabbit Holes, and Dead Ends, 63 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1215, 1222–28 (2011) (praising Koh’s view that the 9/11 attacks triggered 
the United States’ right of self-defense and targeting in foreign countries, while criticizing 
opponents of U.S. policy on targeted killing as imposing unworkable standards).   
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further planning and preparation that access to a remote haven may 
facilitate.  Violence planned in such havens will eventually find its way 
to targeting states, inducing mass casualties that readily meet LOAC’s 
intensity requirement.248  An unduly strict imminence requirement 
would force states to choose between two kinds of hindsight bias: (1) the 
hindsight bias of proponents of a strict imminence requirement, who 
would criticize a state for the premature use of force, or (2) the 
hindsight bias of domestic constituencies, who would criticize a state for 
acting too late.  International law cannot retain a critical mass of support 
if it places states in this precarious position.249 
The United Nations Security Council evidently agreed, because 
resolutions enacted after September 11 transcended the rigidity of 
Webster’s formulation250 and ratified a more flexible conception of self-
defense.251  Applicable only to proven terrorist threats, this test used the 
eventual certainty of attack252 as a proxy for Webster’s imminence 
requirement.253  Using a sliding scale that balances two or more elements 
 
248. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 566–68 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ 
tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf.  
249. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence 
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 549–56 (2002). 
250. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 249 (4th ed. 
2005) (noting that “Webster’s prose was inclined to overstatement”) 
251. For example, Security Council Resolution 1373 stipulates that member states 
should “combat [terrorism] by all means” and “work together . . . to prevent and suppress 
terrorist attacks.”  See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 pmbl. (Sept. 28, 2001). 
252. Cf. Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
44–46 (2003) (discussing problem of intransigence related to ideological commitments of 
members of terrorist networks). 
253. The International Court of Justice has held that the right of self-defense under 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter was limited to cases of “armed attack . . . imputable 
to a foreign State.”  See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9, 2004).  This 
interpretation contravenes both the text of the provision and sound policy.  The text of 
Article 51 refers only to attacks “against” a state, and says nothing about the source of those 
attacks.  See DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 250, at 204.  
Jurists and commentators have vigorously criticized the court’s rationale, arguing that it 
enshrines artificial distinctions.  See Legal Consequences, 2004 I.C.J. at 211, ¶ 16 (Higgins, J., 
concurring); id. at 240–41, ¶ 3 (Buergenthal, J., dissenting); Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense 
and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 70–
72 (2005); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the 
Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 52, 57–59 (2005).  For historical background on 
America’s massive internal conflict, see Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War 
During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1845–47 (2010), which argues that the 
Civil War Supreme Court generally viewed the laws of war as prevailing over otherwise 
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as a proxy for a conjunctive test that analyzes these elements separately 
is a common jurisprudential move that also has echoes in the criminal 
law’s view of self-defense.254  Indeed, historical sources show ample 
support for this more pragmatic approach to the jus ad bellum.255 
A narrower approach to self-defense would also send a dangerous 
signal to host states that are weak or sympathetic to terrorist networks.  
The United Nations framework that required states to combat terrorism 
is vulnerable to hold-out problems.  Weak states cannot preserve the 
monopoly on the use of force that guarantees the public good of 
security.  In such states, contending factions buy off officials to gain 
immunity from prosecution.  Allowing officials to take bribes from 
terrorist networks256 in exchange for a safe harbor would undermine the 
post-September 11 United Nations framework.  Permitting officials who 
feel an ideological affinity with terrorist networks to harbor them has 
the same effect.  The United Nations has no readily available means for 
holding such officials accountable.  Remote targeting gives victim states 
a remedy that is not contingent on host country officials’ fickle 
allegiances. 
To signal an overall disposition to observe LOAC, proxy compliance 
in remote targeting would have to observe a number of stringent 
conditions.  It could proceed only if a host nation for a terrorist network 
was unable or unwilling to apprehend suspects.257  For countries that 
 
applicable constitutional norms. 
254. See Amos N. Guiora, Self-Defense—From the Wild West to 9/11: Who, What, When, 
41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631, 652–53 (2008). 
255. See VATTEL, supra note 68, at 249 (stating that right to self-defense is “in direct 
ratio to the degree of probability attending it, and to the seriousness of the evil with which 
one is threatened”).  
256. Terrorist networks certainly have cash on hand, often gained from drug trafficking 
and other illicit activities.  See Phil Williams, Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: 
Nexus, Appropriation, or Transformation?, in COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 
126, 138–39 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E. Eckert eds., 2008) (detailing the involvement of 
Tamil Tigers in criminal conduct, including heroin trade, human trafficking, gun-running, and 
extortion); Eric Talbot Jensen, Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of Armed 
Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 704–05 (2012) (discussing non-state actors’ involvement in 
drug trade).  See generally HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 27–28 (noting “strategic alliances” 
between organized crime and terrorist groups). 
257. See Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War Against Al-
Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 25–36 (2011) (looking to neutrality law to define “enemy” that 
can be targeted or detained); Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative 
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 499–503 (2012) (finding 
authority for targeting decisions in law of neutrality, which authorizes state that has been 
victimized (“victim state”) by forces that have received sanctuary from another state 
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possess the monopoly on the use of force inherent in sovereignty and 
that are willing to use that force to comply with United Nations Security 
Council resolutions, remote targeting would be off the table.  Moreover, 
remote targeting would only be permissible against fighters belonging or 
with operational ties to Al Qaeda.258  That limitation ties remote 
targeting to international259 and domestic260 endorsement of self-defense 
against terrorism.  Other countries contending with terrorists from 
different groups that have not been the subject of specific Security 
Council resolutions, such as Israel, Turkey, or Colombia, would not be 
authorized to remotely target members of those organizations.  The 
targeting state would also have to observe the principle of 
proportionality.261  While judicial review of the targeting decision would 
not be required,262 a government lawyer using reasonable diligence 
 
(“territorial state”) to cross border of territorial state in order to remove threat); Matthew C. 
Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 429, 442 (2010) (quoting John Bellinger, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, 
Legal Issues in War on Terrorism, Address Before the London School of Economics (Oct. 31, 
2006)); George H. Aldrich, Book Review, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 167, 170 (2011).  But see Kevin 
Jon Heller, The Law of Neutrality Does Not Apply to the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, and It’s a 
Good Thing, Too: A Response to Chang, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 115 (2011) (arguing that 
neutrality law is inappropriate framework because it must be applied symmetrically, which 
would also bar states from assisting in efforts against Al Qaeda); Rebecca Ingber, Untangling 
Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 75 (2011) 
(criticizing Chang’s reliance on neutrality law as creating unduly broad capacity to detain).  
258. See Chesney, supra note 45, at 20–22.  To be part of Al Qaeda in this sense, a target 
would have to be part of an operational chain of command with Al Qaeda leadership at the 
summit.  Id. at 21. 
259. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 pmbl. (Sept. 28, 2001); DINSTEIN, WAR, 
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 250, at 207–08; cf. Mark A. Drumbl, 
Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the 
International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 16–22 (2002) (arguing, in context of United 
States military intervention in Afghanistan, that the United Nations Security Council 
resolution should not be viewed as authorizing use of force, but that intervention could be 
viewed under international law as self-defense against “armed attack”). 
260. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the 
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2113–14 (2005). 
261. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Israel ¶ 41 [2005] 
(Isr.); GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTLAWS, & TERRORISTS: 
LESSONS FROM THE WAR ON TERRORISM 91 (2010) (arguing that targeting state’s greater 
“control over the time, means, and methods of strike mandates . . . a heightened degree of 
care” in avoiding collateral damage).   
262. Compare Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010) (discussing basis 
for government’s alleged targeting decision but ultimately holding that matter constituted 
political question), with Guiora, supra note 254, at 672–73 (arguing for judicial review in 
special court), and Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted 
Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 445–50 (2009) (suggesting need for some 
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would have to sign off on each of these criteria prior to initiation of an 
attack.263  These measures, while they do not eliminate the risk of abuse, 
would signal continued fidelity to the moderate disposition that has 
guided LOAC.264 
While some NGOs will still be skeptical, others will recognize that 
these same weapons can facilitate humanitarian intervention against 
abusive state actors.  Just as waiting for terrorist networks to strike 
yields opportunity costs, waiting for world opinion and trade sanctions 
to alleviate human rights abuses can cause irreparable harm.  The 
Security Council’s ratification of NATO’s Kosovo intervention confirms 
this truth.  Many NGOs supported the Kosovo intervention,265 sought 
action to deal with the slaughter in Darfur, and supported action in 
Libya.  Calibrated remote attacks on Al Qaeda fighters signal that 
strong democracies retain the ability to act against other human rights 
violators.266  For this reason, remote targeting that complies with 
identification norms such as the principle of distinction and meets the 
other requirements discussed above will not prompt uniform opposition 
from NGOs.267  That lack of unanimity, coupled with tacit support from 
 
procedural safeguards). 
263. See SOLIS, supra note 49, at 531 (discussing the role of the attorney-advisor). 
264. For efforts to reframe targeting law that provide further safeguards, see Jennifer C. 
Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside 
the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049532 (seeking to formulate targeting criteria that will respect both 
LOAC and human rights norms); and Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting 
and Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042172 (arguing for uniform approach to detention and targeting 
centering on availability of alternatives to confinement or use of lethal force). 
265. See Goldstone, supra note 44, at 61 (noting “remarkably low civilian casualty rate” 
in Kosovo intervention, apparently due to use of precision bombing technology); cf. Edward 
C. Luck, Building a Norm: The Responsibility to Protect Experience, in MASS ATROCITY 
CRIMES, supra note 44, at 108, 110–14 (discussing ebb and flow in evolution of responsibility 
to protect against atrocities). 
266. Cf. Eric Schmitt & Steven Lee Myers, Sharper Surveillance and NATO 
Coordination Aided Rebel Advance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2011, at A9 (discussing use of 
drones in Libya conflict). 
267. NGOs have run the gamut in their responses to targeted killing, with a median 
response seeking more concrete articulation of targeting criteria.  See Gabor Rona, Letter to 
the Editor, A Spotlight on Drone Strikes in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at A22; see 
also Scott Shane, C.I.A. Is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 
2011, at A1 (analyzing conflicting reports, including independent experts who believe that 
precautions for drone strikes have minimized but not eliminated civilian casualties); Scott 
Wilson, On Sept. 11, a Challenge for Obama, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2010, at A1 (quoting 
Tom Malinowski, Washington director of Human Rights Watch, as arguing that Obama 
administration’s overall respect for rule of law and repudiation of torture “legitimize[d] . . . 
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domestic institutions such as courts,268 suggests that remote targeting 
that complies with identification norms will be a sustainable change to 
LOAC.269 
B.  Trying Material Support in Military Commissions 
It is always fitting to end at a beginning, and Salim Hamdan’s 
material support conviction before a military commission offers a useful 
final example of the structural approach.  From a utilitarian perspective, 
Hamdan’s prosecution was a useful expedient for the government.  
Hamdan’s trial in 2008 was a dry run for bigger trials that have yet to 
occur, such as the trial of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed.270  More generally, the charge of material support for Al 
Qaeda did not require heavy lifting by the government, since in both its 
ordinary criminal law incarnation271 and iteration in the Military 
 
pursuing al-Qaeda” through tactics including drone strikes). 
268. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 9. 
269. Key human rights activists and scholars now serve in the Obama administration, 
shaping a policy that both targets suspected terrorists and participates in humanitarian 
interventions.  See Paul Starobin, Op-Ed, A Moral Flip-Flop? Defining ‘War,’ N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 7, 2011, at SR5 (quoting Harold Koh, noted Yale Law scholar on human rights and 
current legal adviser to the State Department, who has also stated the administration’s 
position supporting drone attacks, as championing intervention in Libya because of need to 
“prevent[] atrocities,” despite tension between ongoing intervention and timetable in War 
Powers Resolution); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Still Crusading, but Now on the Inside, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 30, 2011, at A10 (discussing role in Obama administration played by human rights 
advocate Samantha Power). 
270. Some have argued that a more appropriate venue for such prosecutions and for 
terrorism-related cases generally is a new national security court.  See GLENN SULMASY, THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A NATURAL EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF 
TERROR 173–75 (2009); Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic 
Choice: Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 CAL. 
W. INT’L L.J. 87, 94 (2008).  Consideration of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
271. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2006) (prohibiting material support to designated 
foreign terrorist organizations); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712, 
2731 (2010) (upholding statute); Margulies, Advising Terrorism, supra note 198 (explaining 
and defending Holder); see also Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?  Anticipatory 
Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 474–86 
(2007) (discussing the government’s ability to bring anticipatory prosecutions on material 
support charges); Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the 
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 12–18 (2005) (discussing background of 
statute); Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers 
for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173, 189–94 (2003) (discussing 
statute’s ramifications for defense lawyers).  For criticisms of Holder, see David Cole, The 
First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 148–49 (2012) (criticizing Holder as 
unduly narrowing free speech protections); Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the 
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Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)272 it does not require specific intent to 
engage in violence.  Despite this utilitarian bonanza, however, 
Hamdan’s conviction raises serious problems under a structural view. 
The general material support charged in Hamdan’s case273 skews the 
time horizon.  Identification norms upheld by courts provide that 
conduct merits punishment only if an individual had notice at the time 
of the conduct at issue that her acts violated the law.  Without the 
principle of legality, a government can readily make up crimes after the 
fact to target its opponents.  While disregarding this principle in LOAC 
cases might not spill over into ordinary adjudication in civilian courts, 
that claim seems both empirically questionable and beside the point: 
Violations of core norms are problematic even in small doses.274 
The MCA’s criminalization of material support to Al Qaeda clashes 
with the principle of legality.  Courts cannot look to the MCA itself, 
because it was enacted years after the conduct at issue took place.  
Instead, courts have to look at the customs and common law of war.  
There, however, the record is wanting.  The Court of Military 
Commission Review decision cites three strands of precedent to support 
its upholding of the material support conviction: the Civil War 
“bushwhacker” cases,275 the Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) theory used 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY),276 and the “membership” cases adjudicated by the Nuremberg 
tribunals.277  Unfortunately, none of these strands is sturdy enough to 
bear the weight.  Each requires something not present in the material 
support cases: a nexus with specific LOAC violations involving injury to 
persons or property. 
The bushwhacker cases are most easily distinguished.  The 
bushwhackers were small criminal bands that operated with minimal 
 
Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1455, 1457–58 (2011) 
(suggesting that Court’s view ignored difficulty of peaceful protest against dictatorial 
regimes). 
272. See 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (2006). 
273. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1258–59 (C.M.C.R. 2011) 
(including acting as bin Laden’s driver and bodyguard as well as dealing in weapons). 
274. See Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo Courts, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 172, 179–80 (2008) (discussing constitutional problems with trying material 
support cases in military commissions). 
275. See Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1279, 1299–1301, 1313. 
276. Id. at 1284–85. 
277. Id. at 1306–07. 
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authorization during the Civil War, robbing and pillaging at will.278  Any 
member of the group, because of its small size, would have participated 
directly in the bushwhackers’ depredations.  None involved a defendant 
like Hamdan, who performed ministerial tasks several steps removed 
from the operational planning or execution of a terrorist plot. 
The JCE strand is also slender.  While JCE is still controversial,279 
even on its own terms it does not stretch far enough to reach the 
conduct here.  In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the ICTY tied JCE to direct 
participation in an operation that caused the murder of civilians.280  
Tadic participated in the forced removal of men from a village, which 
was already illegal under international human rights law.281  The tribunal 
merely held that individuals who participated in the forced removal 
were liable for reasonably foreseeable acts that occurred in the course of 
the operation.282 
The Court of Military Commission Review’s final gambit was the 
“membership” cases brought before the international Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal after World War II.283  This strand is the weakest of all.  
Prosecutors and tribunals at Nuremberg recognized the due process 
dangers in criminalizing mere membership and limited the prosecutions 
accordingly.  After initially planning to charge Nazi entities like the 
Gestapo and SS with being criminal organizations and then charge 
thousands of individual members, prosecutors became anxious that 
membership was an unduly amorphous basis for guilt.284  As a result, 
they largely abandoned their plans, citing membership as the sole charge 
in only three cases.285  In other cases, defendants were also charged with 
serious crimes against humanity, usually the killing of civilians.  Ten 
 
278. See FRANCIS LIEBER, GUERRILLA PARTIES CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO 
THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR 16–17 (1862). 
279. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal 
Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 84–86 (2005) (claiming due process problems with JCE doctrine, 
which in some tribunals has been read to require little in the way of knowledge or intent by 
defendant). 
280. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 170–71 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
281. See id. ¶ 178. 
282. See id. ¶¶ 184, 204. 
283. See United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1306–07 (C.M.C.R. 2011). 
284. See Jonathan A. Bush, Lex Americana: Constitutional Due Process and the 
Nuremberg Defendants, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 515, 533–35 (2001). 
285. See id. at 534 & n.75. 
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defendants were acquitted of more serious charges and convicted solely 
of membership offenses.286  Virtually all of those convicted were senior 
officials in criminal entities—principals rather than foot soldiers.287  
Striving to find an analog to Hamdan’s foot-soldier status, the court 
cited the example of noncommissioned officer Mathias Graf.288  Graf, 
however, served in a German unit that was directly responsible for the 
murder of scores of civilians.  That unit, in turn, was part of the 
notorious Einsatzgruppen, which killed hundreds of thousands of 
noncombatants.289  Even so, the tribunal sentenced Graf to time 
served.290  In sum, the Nuremberg tribunals provide virtually no support 
for making a bit player’s service a war crime; indeed, they offer a 
cautionary tale on the difficulties inherent in this task.291 
The government has not bolstered its case by arguing in the D.C. 
Circuit that, regardless of the international law of war, the “U.S. 
common law of war” authorized trial of material support charges against 
 
286. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1307. 
287. For example, Dr. Helmut Poppendick was Chief Physician of Main Race and 
Settlement Office and Konrad Meyer-Hetling was chief of the planning office and helped 
craft the plan for deportations of ethnic minorities from German-controlled Eastern Europe.  
Id. at 1307–08.  The court also discussed defendants Flick and Steinbrinck, charter members 
of the quaint group, “Friends of Himmler.”  Id. at 1308.  The court failed to mention that the 
defendants were not merely friends of the psychopathic head of the SS, but actually 
bankrolled his infamously lethal organization.  See 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 1221 
(1952) (“[E]ach of [the defendants] gave to Himmler . . . a blank check.”). 
288. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1307. 
289. 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 369–70 (1952) [hereinafter 4 WAR CRIMES 
TRIALS]; see also CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE 
BATTALION 101 AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND 18–25 (1992) (recounting detailed 
history of one typical Einsatzgruppen unit). 
290. 4 WAR CRIMES TRIALS, supra note 288, at 587. 
291. The analysis should be different when a defendant has furnished direct and 
substantial support to commission of a war crime.  For example, material support would be an 
appropriate charge for an individual who, with advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks, helped 
fashion Al Qaeda’s propaganda effort.  Given the importance of propaganda to Al Qaeda, it 
would be both fair and accurate to describe such an individual as a principal in the 
organization, like the “Friends of Himmler” convicted of membership offenses at Nuremberg.  
See United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141 1159–61, 1264 (C.M.C.R. 2011) 
(upholding conviction of individual who served as bin Laden’s personal propagandist, at bin 
Laden’s order produced video urging perfidious attacks on U.S. military targets, and prepared 
martyrdom wills for two of the September 11 hijackers).   
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Hamdan in a military commission.292  The “U.S. common law of war” 
argument does not rely on the Constitution’s Define and Punish Clause, 
which empowers Congress to “define and punish . . . Offenses against 
the Law of Nations.”293  Instead, the government’s new argument relies 
on Congress’s power under Article I, section 8 to make rules for the 
army and navy, as well as other textual anchors of Congress’s authority 
over war.294  However, this pivot to a posited “U.S. common law of war” 
ignores the Framers’ profound concern with signaling the new republic’s 
fidelity to international norms.295  Given the Framers’ concern, it would 
seem incongruous for the Constitution to permit Congress to bypass the 
requirements of the Define and Punish Clause and authorize military 
commissions under other provisions.   
Supreme Court precedent tells a similar tale.  In Ex Parte Quirin,296 
the Court catalogued the various sources of Congress’s and the 
President’s power over armed conflict, but then focused primarily on the 
Define and Punish Clause.  Congress, according to the Court, has always 
viewed the law of war as “part of the law of nations.”297  In Yamashita v. 
Styer,298 the Court reinforced this understanding, noting that in the 
Articles of War, Congress, pursuant to the Define and Punish Clause, 
“incorporated . . . by reference”299 the law of war.  This body of law, the 
 
292. See Brief for the United States, Hamdan v. United States, No. 11-1257, 24–46 (D.C. 
Circuit Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ 
Hamdan-Brief-for-US-As-Filed.pdf.  
293. U.S. Const., art I, § 8, cl. 10. 
294. Id. cl. 14; see also id. cl. 1 (empowering Congress to “provide for the common 
Defence”); id. cl. 11 (empowering Congress to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”); id. cl. 18 (empowering 
Congress to enact laws “which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers”).   
295. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 28, at 233 (James Madison) (noting that 
the Define and Punish Clause cured the problem posed by Articles of Confederation, which 
did not empower the federal government to remedy offenses by individual states or citizens 
against law of nations, and “consequently le[ft] it in the power of any indiscreet member to 
embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692, 715–18 (2004) (discussing Framers’ concerns, which were precipitated by incidents 
involving attacks on foreign diplomats in New York and Philadelphia that violated principle 
of diplomatic immunity); cf. J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define 
and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 874–80 (2007) 
(discussing role in Constitution’s enactment of incidents involving attacks on diplomats). 
296. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
297. Id. at 27–28. 
298. 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
299. Id. at 7–8. 
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Court noted, included the “system of military common law . . . deemed 
applicable by courts.”300  Stressing this corpus’s international pedigree, 
the Court observed that the law of war also included international 
agreements such as the Hague Convention.301  Since the Hague 
Convention imposed new restraints on states in conducting warfare,302 
this observation amounted at least to tacit acknowledgment that United 
States practice regarding the law of war was authoritative not in its own 
right, but only as it informed interpretation of the “law of nations.”  
Embracing the government’s “U.S. common law of war” theory would 
turn this venerable understanding on its head.    
Making general material support, such as driving or cooking, into a 
war crime is also shortsighted because it discourages reconciliation.  
Barring prosecution for such conduct is a corollary of the separation of 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  This separation paves the way for peace 
by assuring foot soldiers for a regime that has violated jus ad bellum that 
surrender will not subject them to punitive measures.303  If individuals in 
this position face prosecution for war crimes, they have little reason to 
lay down their arms.304  Bitterness undermines deliberation, igniting a 
new cycle of violence. 
Vindicating the bitter-enders, classifying material support as a war 
crime signals that war crimes prosecutions are merely a form of victor’s 
justice.  This sentiment erodes LOAC’s legitimacy.  To preserve the 
legitimacy of war crimes prosecutions, a state must demonstrate that it 
promotes universal norms, not parochial interests.305  While civilian 
 
300. Id. at 8. 
301. Id. 
302. See Schmitt, supra note 4, at 800; Watkin, supra note 4, at 21. 
303. See generally Sloane, supra note 59, 48–49 (discussing importance of separation). 
304. Protective theorists make this point.  See Pejic, supra note 91, at 354 (quoting 
Additional Protocol II, art. 6(5), and stating the IHL encourages states to grant the “‘broadest 
possible amnesty’” at conclusion of hostilities).  Successful transitions have frequently taken 
this turn.  See JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 4–22 (2004) (stating that ancient Athenian democrats discovered that imposing 
sanctions on officials of previous oligarchical regime was counterproductive, while 
reconciliation provided those officials with a stake in the new regime’s success). 
305. Cf. Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization Through Trials for Violations of 
International Law: Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 427, 471–90 (2009) (arguing that military commission 
proceedings that are perceived as illegitimate do not mobilize global communities against 
terrorism).  See generally Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda 
Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on 
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 613–20 (2002) 
(arguing that international law supports use of military tribunals). 
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criminal law targets a vast spectrum of offenses, including violations of 
health and safety rules and white-collar crimes, war crimes should be 
defined within a narrower bandwidth that focuses on violence against 
civilians, or against the wounded, helpless, or deceived.  Prosecution of 
the senior officials, who comprised the bulk of the Nuremberg 
defendants, passed this test.  Prosecution of defendants who conspired 
to commit specific crimes of violence does as well.306  That clear signaling 
is necessary to overcome the special stressors that congeal in the fog of 
war.  In contrast, prosecuting people for driving leaders dilutes the 
opprobrium we appropriately attach to war crimes.307 
Finally, criticism by NGOs of this particular use of military 
commissions does not reflect the hindsight bias that plagues NGOs 
elsewhere.  Hindsight bias is most damaging when it forces a party to 
incur substantial opportunity costs.  For example, limiting a state’s 
ability to target a bomb maker can produce civilian and combatant 
casualties once the bomb maker’s latest creation reaches its intended 
victims.  Hamdan’s case does not present this problem because 
Hamdan’s regular service to bin Laden would have made him a person 
directly participating in hostilities whom an opposing party could 
target308 or detain.309  Either of these options would have removed 
 
306. A plurality of the Supreme Court asserted that conspiracy charges were not triable 
in military commissions, even when the defendant had participated in a specific plot.  See 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 598–613 (2006).  However, Justice Stevens’ opinion also 
cited examples of conspiracy charges tried before military commissions, including charges 
against the conspirators in the plot to assassinate President Lincoln.  Id. at 604–09.  Moreover, 
Justice Kennedy declined to join the four-person plurality that found that conspiracy charges 
in military commissions were categorically precluded.  Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Kennedy’s absence casts significant doubt on the durability of the plurality opinion’s 
categorical approach. 
307. In its June 2011 Hamdan decision, the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review 
cites a passage from a Nuremberg tribunal case that analogizes a convicted defendant to a 
cook on a pirate vessel.  United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1309 (C.M.C.R. 
2011) (citing 4 WAR CRIMES TRIALS, supra note 288, at 372–73).  Here, as well, however, 
several grains of salt are required.  Pirate vessels are basically bushwhackers at sea, and a 
cook is likely in either context to share in the plunder and the preceding mayhem.  Moreover, 
the Nuremberg case concerned soldiers in the Einsatzgruppen, who as noted earlier were 
directly responsible for many civilian deaths.  Finally, the Hamdan court failed to note that 
the passage is not from an opinion of the tribunal, but from a statement by the prosecutor 
Telford Taylor.  4 WAR CRIMES TRIALS, supra note 289, at 369, 373.  Prosecutors’ statements 
may be eloquent (as this one was), but they are not precedent. 
308. See Bill Boothby, “And for such time as”: The Time Dimension to Direct 
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741, 753–55 (2010) (discussing 
membership in an organized armed group as a basis for targeting).  Even if Hamdan were not 
deemed a legitimate target, Osama bin Laden would certainly have been, based on his place 
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Hamdan from hostilities for the duration of the conflict.  The availability 
of these options reduces the opportunity cost of foregoing a military 
commission proceeding. 
VII.  POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
A model’s approach to particular cases can sometimes mask deeper 
flaws.  In this connection, a number of critiques of the structural 
approach merit response.  First, a structural approach that relies heavily 
on flexibility may be a contradiction in terms.  Second, the approach 
here may unduly elevate the status of NGOs in IHL, at the expense of 
more formal entities such as transnational tribunals and the United 
Nations.  Finally, the approach here may be Eurocentric, failing to 
understand the distinctively non-Western virtues of tactics employed by 
terrorist networks.  I discuss each criticism in turn. 
A.  Structure and Flexibility 
One critique might question the flexible nature of the test here.  
Some distinguished scholars would argue that a structural theory should 
be more formal,310 hinging on express approval of stakeholders.  In 
contrast, the test here has a role for formality, particularly in the general 
preference for judicial review, but often opts for a more informal 
approach to observance of time horizon and signaling norms.  There is 
no contradiction, however, in referring to the theory advanced here as 
structural in nature. 
The American constitutional tradition demonstrates that a structural 
turn does not require rigidity.  In structural views of the United States 
Constitution, courts and commentators have regularly allowed for play 
in the joints.  Formal requirements can give way to pragmatic proxies.  
For example, executive authority can accrue not only through express 
legislative consent, but also through a course of dealing over time that 
includes legislative acquiescence.311 
 
in the Al Qaeda command structure.  If the United States or its allies had successfully 
targeted bin Laden during Hamdan’s service to him, Hamdan’s death in the course of this 
operation would not have violated the proportionality principle.   
309. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 869, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ruling that individual 
who had participated in training camps and served as regular cook for Al Qaeda forces was 
detainable), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); cf. 590 F.3d at 884–85 (Williams, J., 
concurring) (asserting that IHL appropriately informed decision about detention). 
310. See, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 20, at 825. 
311. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686–88 (1981) (upholding presidential 
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Moreover, a certain amount of play in the joints promotes structural 
soundness.  Engineers build flexibility into structures like bridges for 
exactly this reason.  As Justice Jackson acknowledged in his landmark 
concurrence on the separation of powers, maintaining constitutionalism 
requires a “workable government”312 that can respond to the 
“imperatives of events.”313 
In this sense, a measure of flexibility is also consistent with a linear 
time horizon as parties decide whether to embark on a shared project, 
such as the governance of armed conflict.  A party relatively happy with 
the status quo at Time 1 may be unwilling to part with any of its options 
if it worries that constraints will place it at a disadvantage at Time 2.  
However, allowing some revision at Time 2 defuses these doubts about 
initial cooperation. 
Initial cooperation may also be lacking if change becomes too easy, 
but the model here addresses that question as well.  Change will not 
occur without uniform approval or acquiescence among domestic 
stakeholders at Level 1 and a critical mass of approval or acquiescence 
among NGOs at Level 2.  Those conditions promote stable governance 
and discourage the volatility that could lead back to a Hobbesian state 
of nature. 
 
negotiation of claims settlement with Iran); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[C]ongressional inertia, indifference, or 
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on 
independent presidential responsibility.”); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of 
the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive power’ 
vested in the President.”); see also WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 114–15 (1994) (describing 
“customary national security law” and presidential powers); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE 
OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 102–05 (2006) 
(analyzing history of “acquiescence doctrine”); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1705 (2011) (book review) (discussing congressional acquiescence as 
providing leeway to executive). 
312. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor 
W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999516 (arguing that historical patterns of 
legislative acquiescence may supplement constitutional text regarding scope of executive 
power). 
313. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); cf. id. at 638 n.5 (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (discussing Jefferson’s decision to complete Louisiana Purchase, despite his 
constitutional doubts). 
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B.  The Role of NGOs 
Some may also criticize the importance placed on NGOs in this 
structural vision.  Apart from the ICRC, NGOs have no formal role in 
international law,314 so it may seem incongruous to discuss them without 
providing for more official entities such as transnational tribunals and 
international organizations.  Nonetheless, there are advantages to 
focusing on NGOs that other approaches keyed to formal actors miss.315 
NGOs contribute in large measure to the agenda of LOAC and the 
language used to describe that agenda.  They interact with courts 
through pleadings and help mobilize communities around litigation and 
other forms of advocacy.316  In fulfilling this role, they have a profound 
influence on the prospects for legal change.  Indeed, certain tribunals, 
including the European Court of Human Rights, have fashioned a 
jurisprudence that limits counterterrorism initiatives,317 tracking NGOs’ 
efforts.  That influence is sometimes healthy and sometimes too 
reminiscent of the hindsight bias that plagues the protective view.  In 
either event, it is a force to be reckoned with. 
International organizations also play a role, for example through 
counterterrorism initiatives such as Security Council Resolutions 1368 
and 1373.318  These measures, however, derive from the advocacy efforts 
of major states, including the United States.  Because of the veto 
possessed by the United States and the Council’s other permanent 
members, the Security Council only acts when major states find 
common ground.  Given this reality, looking to a consensus among 
 
314. The ICRC does not have a formal law-making capacity, but engages in 
humanitarian activities with respect to prisoners of war and civilians affected by armed 
conflict.  See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 9. 
315. In this respect, the approach here borrows from criminal law scholarship on 
pragmatic interactions between courts, prosecutors, and legislatures.  See Daniel C. Richman 
& William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual 
Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 590–91, 597–98 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529–68 (2001); cf. Chesney, 
supra note 34, at 1385–91 (discussing importance of functional and prudential considerations 
in national security law). 
316. See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 891, 942, 945–49 (2008); Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices 
of Advocacy Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 358–61 (2009). 
317. See Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 30 BHRC 637, at 45–62 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. July 7, 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,ECHR,,IRQ,,4e25
466e2,0.html (holding that, absent express derogation, state violated human rights law by 
detaining individual in Iraq in course of role as part of United Nations-sponsored force). 
318. See supra note 76. 
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major states as a structural surrogate for international organizations is a 
reasonable strategy. 
C.  Distinction and Essentialism 
One might also argue that the norms of IHL, such as the principle of 
distinction, are a creature of the asymmetry between those states with 
advanced weaponry and parties without it.  Paul Kahn has written that 
“the asymmetrical capacities of Western . . . forces . . . themselves create 
the conditions for increasing use of terrorism.”319  If there is a cycle of 
destruction, Kahn added, the West is to blame.320  Structuring a system 
to encourage compliance with LOAC, on this view, merely perpetuates 
inequality. 
Unfortunately, this argument is both radically over- and under-
inclusive.  It is over-inclusive because it disregards the many compelling 
non-Western approaches that have accomplished change without 
targeting innocents or violating other LOAC norms.  From Gandhi to 
the social-media-driven Arab Spring, non-Western movements have 
been innovators in nonviolent methods.  Treating the targeting of 
innocents as a hallmark of non-Western practice seems inaccurate as 
well as invidious. 
Moreover, the under-inclusiveness of this argument is also a major 
problem.  Suppose that Western powers decided, as Bush administration 
officials did in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, that the rules barring 
coercive interrogation were useless in combating the non-Western 
terrorist tactics that essentialists so matter-of-factly describe.  It would 
be unacceptable to view this change as a resourceful Western solution to 
non-Western terrorism.  Essentialist logic, however, is helpless to rebut 
that characterization.  Essentialism is at bottom very similar to LOAC 
violations: once it becomes well ensconced, it quickly pervades the 
landscape in ways that the originator cannot control.  Few arguments 
would seem more divorced from both sound temporal judgment and 
holistic signaling. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Non-state actors challenged LOAC framework after September 11.  
Without reciprocity as a guide, both states and NGOs sought changes.  
 
319. See Kahn, supra note 221, at 6. 
320. See id. 
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However, criteria for assessing those proposed changes have been 
elusive. 
Contending schools of thought have sought to control the terrain of 
LOAC.  Both the utilitarian and protective turns, however, have fallen 
short.  The utilitarians offer a promising toolkit that accurately identifies 
certain non-state groups, such as terrorist networks, as free riders on 
LOAC norms.  However, in casting their lot with states, utilitarians 
leave their toolkit behind and unwisely rely on the sometimes flawed 
judgment of state leaders.  While protective theorists bring to the table a 
distrust of the state that heads off this tendency, they focus unduly on 
state policies and fail to acknowledge that asymmetries between states 
and terrorists on matters such as identification requirements ultimately 
put civilians at risk. 
To remedy these problems, this Article suggests a structural model 
which views changes to LOAC as a two-level game played within states 
and between states and NGOs.  Under the model, states propose 
utilitarian changes, which at Level 1 require approval from domestic 
stakeholders such as the military and the courts.  Internal divisions will 
prompt unified NGO opposition, making a proposed change 
unsustainable, as the Bush administration discovered with its harsh 
interrogation policies and effort to remove IHL protections from 
suspected terrorists.  In contrast, a unified state response will often split 
NGOs at Level 2, paving the way for change.  By the same token, NGOs 
need to cultivate support from Level 1 stakeholders.  At both levels, the 
game hinges on two values: linear time horizons and holistic signaling. 
Time horizons seek to curb both shortsighted thinking and its close 
cousin, hindsight bias.  Holistic signaling entails messages of fidelity to 
LOAC framework and the prospects for continued global cooperation.  
States can develop institutions such as courts that promote both 
temporal judgment and holistic signaling but are often tempted toward 
skewed time horizons during times of crisis.  Non-state actors can 
develop comparable institutions, but the need for secrecy and signaling 
to other non-state actors often undermines this process.  NGOs are 
vigilant against state backsliding, but that vigilance comes at the price of 
hindsight bias and a failure to adequately gauge incentives for violent 
non-state actors. 
The structural approach aids in analyzing current LOAC issues.  
Proposals like the Bush administration’s harsh interrogation policies and 
the ICRC’s direct participation in hostilities guidance fail both the 
signaling and temporal judgment tests.  Carefully tailored remote 
targeting that observes identification norms is an example of sustainable 
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change.  However, trying material support charges in military 
commissions is problematic, both undermining the principle of legality 
and sending ominous signals about victors’ justice. 
The structural model is far from perfect.  It may take too dim a view 
of non-state actors and give states too much credit.  It also may accord 
NGOs too large a normative role, given their lack of formal status.  
Others may have models that depict change more accurately or that 
stress different values.  However, stressing a linear time horizon and 
holistic signaling defuses rhetoric and sharpens deliberation about 
LOAC changes in the wake of September 11.  Those virtues amply 
reward the effort. 
